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IMMORAL TRADEMARKS AFTER BRUNETTI 
Ned Snow 
ABSTRACT 
Trademark law has recently experienced a fundamental shift. 
For more than a century, marks that were vulgar, profane, and 
obscene could not receive trademark protection. In 2019, however, 
the Supreme Court in Iancu v. Brunetti invalidated the statutory 
provision that had prevented such marks from receiving 
protection—the bars to “immoral” and “scandalous” marks. Those 
bars violated the First Amendment because they enabled the 
government to judge whether ideas in marks were inappropriate. 
Similarly, two years prior to Brunetti, the Court in Matal v. Tam 
struck down a bar to marks that could “disparage” others. The 
Court reasoned that to disparage is to offend, and the ability to 
offend is a core First Amendment value. So in the wake of Brunetti 
and Tam, the public must now be exposed to marks that employ 
highly offensive expression. Racial epithets, the F-word, and 
pornography are now more likely to appear as brands. And as time 
passes, businesses will gain confidence that such emotional 
attention-grabbing expressions will continue to be eligible for 
trademark protection. More businesses will begin to invest in 
them. The public, in turn, will be subject to a commercial 
experience that is more offensive and less inviting. 
Congress must therefore act. Congress must bar trademark 
registration for the specific categories of vulgar, profane, and 
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obscene language. Unlike the bars in Brunetti and Tam, these bars 
would not violate the First Amendment. They would target modes 
of expression—offensive methods of communication that invoke 
emotive force. The offensiveness of the communication derives not 
from any idea contained in a mark, but from the particular 
language employed. That distinction makes a constitutional 
difference. Modes of expression can be restricted in certain 
circumstances, such as the trademark context: the restriction 
furthers the trademark purpose of creating a commercial 
environment that is inviting to consumers. Congress may and 
should deny protection. 
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I.INTRODUCTION 
Two recent Supreme Court cases call into question whether 
Congress may condition trademark registration on moral criteria. 
In Matal v. Tam and Iancu v. Brunetti, the Court ruled that 
Congress could not bar registration for marks that “disparage” 
others or that are “immoral” or “scandalous.”1 The disparagement, 
immoral, and scandalous bars all targeted offensive speech, and 
the right to speak offensive ideas represents a core First 
Amendment value.2 Striking down a century of statutory 
precedent, the Court chose to protect businesses’ interests in 
speaking over the public’s interest in avoiding offensive marks.3 
Tam and Brunetti, however, do not imply that trademark law 
must altogether divorce itself from morality. In particular, the 
cases do not imply that Congress must extend trademark 
protection to all vulgar, profane, and obscene expression. Those 
forms of expression represent modes of communicating an idea, 
and regulating a mode of expression is very different from 
regulating the idea within the expression.4 Indeed, the Brunetti 
Court explicitly left open the possibility for Congress to bar 
immoral modes of expressing marks.5 Some Justices even noted in 
their concurrences that bars to vulgar, profane, and obscene marks 
would be constitutional.6 Thus, the First Amendment may yet 
allow for Congress to deny trademark protection for certain types 
of immoral marks. 
The question thus arises as to whether Congress should 
respond to Tam and Brunetti by denying trademark protection for 
expression that employs vulgar, profane, and obscene language. 
 
 1. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2302 (2019); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 
1765 (2017). 
 2. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2300–01; Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751, 1763. 
 3. See Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (barring protection 
for “immoral” and “scandalous” marks), invalidated in part by Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2297; 
Trademark Act of 1905, Pub. L. No. 84, § 5(a), 33 Stat. 724, 725 (prohibiting trademark 
registration for scandalous or immoral matter), repealed by 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). 
 4. See discussion infra Section III.B.1. 
 5. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2302 n.*. 
 6. See id. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“[R]efusing registration to obscene, vulgar, or profane marks does not offend the First 
Amendment.”); id. at 2303 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Our decision does not prevent Congress 
from adopting a more carefully focused statute that precludes the registration of marks 
containing vulgar terms that play no real part in the expression of ideas.”); id. at 2306 
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[I]t is hard to see how a statute 
prohibiting the registration of only highly vulgar or obscene words discriminates based on 
‘viewpoint.’”); id. at 2318 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“With 
‘scandalous’ narrowed to reach only obscene, profane, and vulgar content, the provision 
would not be overly broad.”). 
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This Article argues that Congress should deny protection and that 
doing so would not violate the First Amendment. The policy 
argument for denying protection is based on three premises.7 The 
first premise is that the public deems the use of vulgar, profane, 
and obscene language to be highly offensive and immoral.8 That 
language is crude, coarse, and base—usually employed solely to 
evoke emotional emphasis.9 Therefore, the law should not 
encourage its use. 
The second premise posits that the forum of commercial 
advertising is particularly unsuited for vulgar, profane, and 
obscene language.10 The public expects commercial actors to 
present their goods through means that are inviting and non-
offensive.11 The law has traditionally upheld this expectation, 
punishing actors who use offensive methods of presentation such 
as robocalls and spam e-mail.12 Furthermore, the use of highly 
offensive language in advertising impedes a robust commercial 
marketplace.13 Some segments of the public will either severely 
limit their exposure to advertising or change their consumption 
choices, and this will negatively affect commercial productivity.14 
Hence, to uphold the expectations of the public and to prevent 
disruption of commercial activity, the law should discourage the 
use of highly offensive language in commercial advertising. 
This leads to the third and final premise—that trademark law 
would be an effective means of deterring the use of such language 
in commercial advertising.15 By denying the language trademark 
protection, Congress would create a strong financial incentive for 
businesses to avoid using the language in their marks.16 Indeed, 
the Trademark Act (the Lanham Act) already denies protection for 
certain content in order to deter people from using that content: 
the Act bars registration for content that is deceptive, descriptive, 
 
 7. See discussion infra Part III. 
 8. See discussion infra Section III.A. 
 9. See discussion infra Section III.A. 
 10. See discussion infra Section III.B. 
 11. See discussion infra Section III.B.1. 
 12. See 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(4), (d) (barring unsolicited spam e-mail of a commercial 
or pornographic content); 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) (barring robocalls). 
 13. See discussion infra Section III.B.2. 
 14. See discussion infra Section III.B.2. 
 15. See discussion infra Section III.C. 
 16. See discussion infra Section III.C. 
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or confusingly similar to other marks.17 For that matter, the 
Lanham Act denies protection for content based on moral reasons: 
the Act bars registration for marks that portray deceased 
presidents (to respect the president’s living spouse) or that portray 
government insignia (to prevent sullying and debasing the 
insignia).18 Denying protection for highly offensive language would 
thus be consistent with existing trademark doctrine. Moreover, 
doing so would support the central purpose of trademark law—to 
serve the interests of consumers.19 Insofar as Congress acts soon—
before businesses start investing in highly offensive marks—
denying trademark protection would be an effective means to deter 
vulgar, profane, and obscene language in commercial 
advertising.20 
But what about the First Amendment? After all, the Supreme 
Court has protected vulgar expression as free speech.21 Yet some 
Justices in the Brunetti case suggested in their concurrences that 
trademark bars to highly offensive language would be 
constitutional.22 The question must therefore be posed: Would 
barring vulgar, profane, and obscene language from trademark 
registration abridge the freedom of speech?23 
This question calls for both a doctrinal and theoretical 
response. Doctrinally, the question raises a preliminary issue 
about whether denying trademark registration would constitute a 
speech-suppressive act.24 Given that the denial would not preclude 
anyone from using offensive language, is the denial an act of 
abridgment? Although the Court’s rulings in Tam and Brunetti 
imply that the denial would indeed constitute an abridgment, the 
issue is still worth considering.25 In the end, the denial does appear 
 
 17. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), (d)–(e). Note that the bar to descriptive marks applies 
only if the mark has not gained secondary meaning. See id. § 1052(f); USPTO v. 
Booking.com B.V., No. 19-46, slip op. at 3 (U.S. June 30, 2020) (“[T]o be placed on the 
principal register, descriptive terms must achieve significance ‘in the minds of the public’ 
as identifying the applicant’s goods or services—a quality called ‘acquired distinctiveness’ 
or ‘secondary meaning.’” (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 211 
(2000))). 
 18. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(b), (c); discussion infra Section III.C.1. 
 19. See discussion infra Section III.C.1. 
 20. See discussion infra Section III.C.2. 
 21. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25–26 (1971) (protecting F-word on jacket 
that communicated opinion about the federal draft). 
 22. See supra note 6. 
 23. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 24. See discussion infra Section IV.A.1. 
 25. See discussion infra Section IV.A.1. 
58 HOUS. L. REV. 401 (2020) 
406 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [58:2 
to constitute an abridgment because trademark restrictions 
influence choices about which speech to use as a mark.26 
The next issue is whether bars to vulgar, profane, and obscene 
marks should be analyzed under a speech doctrine that allows for 
content-based restrictions in certain circumstances.27 More 
specifically, the issue is whether the doctrine of limited public 
forums should apply to the trademark context.28 That doctrine 
applies where the government extends a resource to facilitate 
private speech.29 Content-based restrictions are permissible if they 
further a purpose of the government resource and if they are 
viewpoint neutral.30 Here, the trademark system represents a 
resource that Congress extends to sellers of goods in order to 
facilitate trademark usage.31 Content restrictions on trademark 
registration are therefore justifiable if they further a purpose of 
trademark law and are viewpoint neutral. The restriction on 
highly offensive language furthers a purpose of trademark law—
i.e., promoting commercial transactions.32 
With respect to the issue of viewpoint neutrality, the analysis 
is more nuanced.33 In Tam, the Court held that Congress’s attempt 
to bar disparaging marks was viewpoint discriminatory,34 and in 
support of that holding, a plurality opined that “[g]iving offense is 
a viewpoint.”35 In Brunetti, a unanimous Court held that 
Congress’s attempt to bar “immoral” marks was similarly 
viewpoint discriminatory.36 In view of these holdings, how can a 
bar to vulgar, profane, and obscene marks be viewpoint-neutral if 
the reason for the bar is that such marks are considered to be 
offensive and immoral? The answer is simple. Tam and Brunetti 
recognized that the bars to disparaging and immoral marks 
targeted the ideas within the marks.37 They restricted offensive 
ideas. By contrast, the bars to vulgar, profane, and obscene marks 
would target the modes of expressing those ideas.38 These bars 
 
 26. See discussion infra Section IV.A.1. 
 27. See discussion infra Section IV.A.2. 
 28. See discussion infra Section IV.A.2. 
 29. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). 
 30. See id. 
 31. See discussion infra Section IV.A.2. 
 32. See discussion infra Section IV.A.2. 
 33. See discussion infra Section IV.B. 
 34. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017). 
 35. Id. (plurality opinion). 
 36. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297, 2303 (2019). 
 37. See discussion infra Sections IV.B.1–2. 
 38. See discussion infra Section IV.B.3. 
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restrict only offensive modes because they serve only to provide 
emphasis, akin to screaming one’s message.39 Although the mode 
of using vulgar language certainly adds emotive force to a mark, it 
does not communicate any specific viewpoint.40 Hence, barring 
that mode of expression would be viewpoint-neutral. 
From a theoretical standpoint, denying protection for vulgar, 
profane, and obscene language seems appropriate under the 
marketplace-of-ideas theory of free speech.41 That theory is most 
relevant here because it reflects the purpose of speaking a message 
through a trademark: just as ideas compete for public acceptance 
in the marketplace of ideas, marks compete for consumer 
recognition in the marketplace of commerce.42 Marketplace theory 
suggests the appropriateness of discouraging highly offensive 
marks because their offensiveness discourages full participation in 
the commercial marketplace, and thereby the marketplace of 
ideas.43 Highly offensive marks lead to messages getting lost in 
their delivery. Therefore, the marketplace-of-ideas theory 
recognizes value in barring such language in the trademark 
context. 
This Article concludes that Congress should bar trademark 
registration for vulgar, profane, and obscene language. Part II sets 
forth the specifics of this proposal, defining the meanings of these 
terms and providing instruction for their proper application. Part 
III argues that sound policy supports this proposal. Part IV 
examines the First Amendment issues. 
II.PROPOSAL 
This Article proposes that Congress bar registration for 
marks that employ vulgar, profane, or obscene language. This Part 
explains that proposal. It describes the sort of expression that 
these bars would target and how the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) should apply these bars. 
The meanings of vulgarity, profanity, and obscenity generally 
consist of crude and base descriptions of certain subject matter, 
and their definitions may overlap.44 They are generally offensive 
to readers, and for this reason, this Article employs only referents 
 
 39. See discussion infra Section IV.B.3. 
 40. See discussion infra Section IV.B.3. 
 41. See discussion infra Section IV.D. 
 42. See discussion infra Section IV.D. 
 43. See discussion infra Section IV.D. 
 44. See ASHLEY MONTAGU, THE ANATOMY OF SWEARING 104–05 (1967) (defining 
categories of swear words). 
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to the particular words without full recitation of the words. First, 
vulgarity consists of expressions that are lewdly indecent.45 This 
includes coarse or crude references to private body parts, to the 
sex act, and to certain bodily functions.46 The F-word and swear 
words that refer to the excretory process (e.g., the S-word) may be 
the most common examples of vulgar expression.47 Second, 
profanity consists of expressions that desecrate figures that are 
held sacred or holy by a segment of the public.48 This includes vain 
references to holy religious figures, such as Jesus Christ, Jehovah, 
or Muhammad, and could also include derogatory references to 
particular races or cultures.49 Third, obscenity consists of 
expressions “which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient 
interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently 
offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”50 This includes 
explicit portrayals of the sex act.51 
In denying registration for these categories of marks, the PTO 
should examine whether a particular mark employs vulgar, 
profane, or obscene language (where language includes both words 
 
 45. Vulgar, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/vulg 
ar [https://perma.cc/LTE5-UYZ6] (last visited Sept. 18, 2020) (defining vulgar as “lewdly or 
profanely indecent”). 
 46. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2307 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (observing that vulgar expression has evolved over time “toward 
words that are sexually explicit or that crudely describe bodily functions”). See generally 
United States v. Biocic, 928 F.2d 112, 115–16 (4th Cir. 1991) (“The important government 
interest [in the public indecency statute] is the widely recognized one of protecting the 
moral sensibilities of that substantial segment of society that still does not want to be 
exposed willy-nilly to public displays of various portions of their fellow citizens’ anatomies 
that traditionally in this society have been regarded as erogenous zones. These still include 
(whether justifiably or not in the eyes of all) the female, but not the male, breast.”). 
 47. See generally FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 509 (2009) 
(reciting and upholding FCC agency opinion stating that “the F-Word ‘is one of the most 
vulgar, graphic and explicit descriptions of sexual activity in the English language’” 
(quoting In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of 
the “Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4979 (2004))). 
 48. Profane, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prof 
ane [https://perma.cc/A74G-QG28] (last visited Sept. 18, 2020) (defining profane as “serving 
to debase or defile what is holy”); Profane, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, https://www-oed-com. 
ezproxy.lib.uh.edu/view/Entry/152024?rskey=dl598B&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid [ht 
tps://perma.cc/GC5R-YJT2] (last visited Sept. 18, 2020) (defining profane as “characterized 
by, exhibiting, or expressive of a disregard or contempt for sacred things (esp., in later use, 
by the taking of God’s name in vain); not respectful of religious practice; irreverent, 
blasphemous, impious; (hence, more generally) ribald, coarse, indecent”). 
 49. See MONTAGU, supra note 44, at 100–01 (providing list of examples of profane 
utterances). The Judeo-Christian tradition holds that God commanded people to refrain 
from making vain references to the name of deity. Exodus 20:7. 
 50. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1973) (defining legal obscenity). 
 51. Id. at 25. 
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and images52) as a means to express an idea. The PTO should not 
deny protection if only the idea itself—rather than the language 
used to express the idea—is highly offensive. The inquiry by the 
PTO, then, should be into whether an average person would be 
highly offended because the mark contains vulgar, profane, or 
obscene language, but not because of a specific idea communicated 
by the mark.53 
A few examples illustrate this sort of analysis that the PTO 
should employ. The first is an example of a vulgar mark that 
expresses an idea that is not vulgar: F— THE DEVIL! Clearly the 
idea of this example is not offensive: the idea represents an 
imperative to harass and harm an evil being. The F-word, 
however, is a vulgar word (a crude reference to sexual intercourse) 
that is highly offensive to many people. Hence, the use of the 
highly offensive word to express the non-offensive idea would 
trigger the vulgarity bar. 
Another example illustrates that a profane method of 
expression (or vulgarity or obscenity) must be highly offensive to 
be denied protection, and that marks that contain profane ideas 
may still receive protection. Consider a mark that communicates 
damnation to a religious figure. The word damn is a swear word 
that may be mildly offensive to some portion of the population, but 
not highly offensive.54 Nevertheless, for a religious group, the idea 
contained within the phrase may be highly offensive, but not 
because of the choice of the word damn; rather, the offense would 
arise because of the idea of damning the religious figure, which is 
communicated by the mark.55 Although this would constitute a 
profane idea because it is highly irreverent toward a religious 
figure, the words themselves used in the trademark do not 
constitute profanity. There is no profane language in the mark 
that serves to communicate the profane idea. Thus, it should not 
be denied trademark registration.  
 
 52. See COLIN CHERRY, ON HUMAN COMMUNICATION 275 (3d ed. 1978). 
 53. Cf. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2301 (2019) (explaining that the 
Government proposed interpreting the scandalous bar so that it would apply only to “marks 
that are offensive [or] shocking to a substantial segment of the public because of their mode 
of expression” such that the PTO would refuse only “marks that are ‘vulgar’—meaning 
‘lewd,’ ‘sexually explicit or profane’” (emphasis added)). 
 54. Although damn may have been highly offensive at the time of Gone with the Wind, 
today the word invokes merely mild offense. See KRISTY BEERS FÄGERSTEN, WHO’S 
SWEARING NOW?: THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF CONVERSATIONAL SWEARING 12 (2012) (noting 
research that, taken together, suggests “damn” to be a “weaker” swear word). 
 55. See generally Muhammad v. City of N.Y. Dep’t of Corr., 904 F. Supp. 161, 168 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (recognizing common belief among Muslims that Muhammad is the “seal 
of the prophets” and the last prophet). 
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By contrast, consider a phrase that uses the same name of the 
religious figure, but with a different purpose—merely to use the 
name in vane so as to express the speaker’s frustration. Such a 
phrase debases the name in order to communicate an idea that is 
not offensive (that someone is frustrated). The vain reference 
would be a profane use of language, so the phrase would fall within 
the scope of the profanity bar. 
A final example illustrates the application of the obscenity 
bar. Consider a mark that states OPEN ORGY and a mark that 
displays a graphic depiction of an orgy. The OPEN ORGY mark 
contains an idea (unrestrained group sex) that is highly offensive 
to a significant portion of the public. It would not be denied 
registration, however, because the method of expressing that idea 
is not offensive. The words open and orgy represent non-offensive 
means of communicating an idea. By contrast, the mark that 
displays a graphic depiction of an orgy would be denied 
registration on the grounds that the display constitutes a highly 
offensive method (a graphic depiction) of expressing the same idea 
(unrestrained group sex). The graphic depiction is obscene. The 
fact that the method of expressing the idea also serves to express 
the idea itself does not change the fact that the method of 
expressing the idea is obscene. The depiction—even though a true 
representation of the idea—is still highly offensive. It would be 
denied protection under the obscenity bar. 
III.POLICY 
The reason to bar trademark registration for marks that 
contain vulgar, profane, and obscene language is simple.56 The 
public generally finds the use of such language to be highly 
offensive and immoral, especially in the context of commercial 
advertising, and trademark law is an effective means for limiting 
such language in that context. This argument relies on three 
premises, addressed in the Sections below. The first premise is 
that the public generally deems the use of this language to be 
highly offensive and immoral.57 The second is that the forum of 
commercial advertising should conform to the public’s preferences 
for proper methods of communicating commercial information.58 
The third is that the system of trademarks represents an effective 
 
 56. Professor Ilhyung Lee has made a similar proposal with regard to barring 
trademark protection for racial epithets. See Ilhyung Lee, Essay, Tam Through the Lens of 
Brunetti: THE SLANTS, FUCT, 69 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 2001 (2019). 
 57. See discussion infra Section III.A. 
 58. See discussion infra Section III.B.1. 
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means for limiting offensive language in commercial advertising.59 
Taken together, these premises establish that Congress should 
deny protection for vulgar, profane, and obscene marks. 
A. Offensive to the Public Generally 
As a general matter, the public finds the use of vulgar, 
profane, and obscene language to be highly offensive.60 The 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) defines these types 
of expression as being “grossly offensive” or “patently offensive.”61 
As one linguistic researcher explained: “[S]ome words are 
consistently judged to be more offensive (abrasive, aggressive, 
impolite, profane, upsetting, etc.) than others. Sexual terms 
generally rated most offensive, followed by excretory terms which, 
in turn, are typically judged more offensive than sacred terms.”62 
In short, “The greater the potential of a word to offend, the likelier 
the word is to be considered a swear word.”63 By definition, vulgar, 
profane, and obscene language is offensive.64 
To be clear, the offensiveness of such language is not merely 
its use in an incorrect context (such as using fart in a formal 
business setting). Rather, the use is considered to be intrinsically 
inappropriate.65 Indeed, many consider use of such language to be 
immoral, for morality represents a standard that defines the 
intrinsic rightness or wrongness of a proposition.66 One study 
 
 59. See discussion infra Section III.C. 
 60. FÄGERSTEN, supra note 54, at 8 (ranking offensiveness of types of swear words). 
 61. See Obscene, Indecent and Profane Broadcasts, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://w 
ww.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/obscene-indecent-and-profane-broadcasts [https://perma.cc/J 
882-AT4V] (Dec. 30, 2019). 
 62. FÄGERSTEN, supra note 54, at 8 (citation omitted). 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Katy Steinmetz, Swearing Is Scientifically Proven to Help You *%$!ing Deal, 
TIME (Dec. 15, 2016, 4:46 PM), https://time.com/4602680/profanity-research-why-we-swear/ 
[https://perma.cc/5XXP-P5V7] (reciting cognitive scientist’s opinion that swear words 
dealing with sex, bodily functions, religion, and groups of people “are built to offend, to 
cause harm, to divide and to denigrate”). 
 65. See Kristin Wong, The Case for Cursing, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2017), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2017/07/27/smarter-living/the-case-for-cursing.html [https://perma.cc/BT84-A 
KVK] (explaining that swearing is viewed as inappropriate or taboo). 
 66. See generally Moral, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/ 
122086?rskey=W1HzE0&result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid [https://perma.cc/W4A6-CK6J] 
(last visited Sept. 18, 2020) (defining moral as “relating to human character or behaviour 
considered as good or bad; of or relating to the distinction between right and wrong, or good 
and evil, in relation to the actions, desires, or character of responsible human beings; 
ethical”); The Definition of Morality, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Feb. 8, 2016), https://plato 
.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/ [https://perma.cc/PHC2-B9P8] (defining morality 
as “certain codes of conduct put forward by a society or a group (such as a religion), or 
accepted by an individual for her own behavior”). 
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indicates that use of such language is perceived as violating the 
moral foundation of purity.67 This Article, however, does not take 
up the question of whether the use is immoral under any number 
of moral philosophies. Instead, the Article merely points out that 
use of the language is well recognized as inherently inappropriate, 
and in that sense, the use is seen to be as immoral.68 This Article 
refers to vulgar, profane, and obscene language as “immoral 
language” only to reflect that many people consider the use of such 
language to be inherently inappropriate. 
Use of immoral language is, of course, common in society. It 
is common in entertainment,69 in informal conversations,70 and 
more recently in political speeches.71 Paradoxically, then, there are 
some situations in which the use of inappropriate language is 
thought to be appropriate.72 There may be circumstances that 
would seem to justify the use.73 Nevertheless, the use of immoral 
language remains highly offensive to many who hear or view it.74 
Indeed, the mere fact that it is used to invoke emotional emphasis 
(in whatever context) indicates that the language is still 
 
 67. See Karolina Sylwester & Matthew Purver, Twitter Language Use Reflects 
Psychological Differences Between Democrats and Republicans, PLOS ONE 2 (Sept. 16, 
2015), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0137422&type 
=printable [https://perma.cc/CZ5Z-VCKY]. 
 68. See, e.g., Gilad Feldman et al., Frankly, We Do Give a Damn: The Relationship 
Between Profanity and Honesty, 8 SOC. PSYCH. & PERSONALITY SCI. 816, 817 (2017), https://j 
ournals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1948550616681055 [https://perma.cc/XG7F-B63G] 
(recognizing that profanity “violates the moral foundations of purity and the common norm 
for speech” (citation omitted)). 
 69. See Barry S. Sapolsky & Barbara K. Kaye, The Use of Offensive Language by Men 
and Women in Prime Time Television Entertainment, 13 ATL. J. COMMC’N 292, 293 (2005). 
 70. FÄGERSTEN, supra note 54, at 10 (“The influence of social context on swearing 
behavior became evident when word frequency studies revealed that swear words occurred 
highly frequently in the informal conversations of college students.” (citations omitted)). 
 71. See, e.g., Peter Baker, The Profanity President: Trump’s Four-Letter Vocabulary, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/19/us/politics/trump-languag 
e.html [https://perma.cc/PL5Q-2LY6]; Donica Phifer, Congresswoman Rashida Tlaib Refers 
to Donald Trump in Speech, Tells Crowd ‘We’ Will ‘Impeach This Motherf---er,’ NEWSWEEK 
(Jan. 4, 2019, 1:28 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/congresswoman-rashida-tliab-refers-d 
onald-trump-speech-tells-crowd-democrats-1279078 [https://perma.cc/CP2P-MW88]; John 
Dickerson, WTF Did Biden Just Say?: A Brief History of Bad Language in Washington, 
SLATE (Mar. 23, 2010, 7:43 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2010/03/wtf-did-biden-
just-say-a-brief-history-of-bad-language-in-washington.html [https://perma.cc/AYF6-5JU 
B]. 
 72. See Wong, supra note 65. 
 73. See, e.g., Feldman et al., supra note 68, at 824 (“[A] higher rate of profanity use 
was associated with more honesty.”). 
 74. See FÄGERSTEN, supra note 54, at 152 (“While the questionnaire participants and 
interview informants consider swearing to be an acceptable practice for themselves, they 
are less willing to sanction or approve of the use of swear words by others.”); supra notes 
60–61. 
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offensive.75 More to the point, the fact that the use may be common 
in some circumstances does not imply that the law should 
encourage the highly offensive language in the commercial context 
of trademarks.76 Section III.B explains the reason that the 
commercial context, in particular, warrants against using 
immoral language. For now, it is sufficient to observe that usage 
of immoral language in some contexts does not imply that the 
public considers the usage appropriate in all contexts. 
Why does the public find the use of immoral language to be 
highly offensive? To an extent, the answer appears to be that the 
language denotes meanings that are entirely inconsistent with 
established norms of human decency.77 Collectively, society holds 
a moral view that in a public setting, private parts of the body 
should be covered and that the acts of excretion and sexual 
intercourse must not occur in the public setting.78 In contrast to 
these established norms, vulgar and obscene expressions call 
attention to the crude portrayal of these body parts and bodily 
functions.79 Vulgar and obscene expressions challenge 
fundamental moral tenets that deal with methods of referring to 
 
 75. See MONTAGU, supra note 44, at 93 (“Constant and overabundant usage of certain 
common swearwords, which sparingly employed do good service, may deprive them of all 
value for the purposes for which they were originally intended.”); Wong, supra note 65 
(recognizing need for swear words not to be commonly used in order to preserve their 
effectiveness). 
 76. Cf. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 529–30 (2009) (“[T]he 
pervasiveness of foul language, and the coarsening of public entertainment in other media 
such as cable, justify more stringent regulation of broadcast programs . . . .”). 
 77. See Vulgar, supra note 45 (defining vulgar to mean “lacking in cultivation” and 
“profanely indecent”); Profane, supra note 48 (defining profane to mean “serving to debase 
or defile what is holy”); Obscene, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/di 
ctionary/obscene [https://perma.cc/CW4J-27XT] (last visited Sept. 18, 2020) (defining 
obscene to mean “abhorrent to morality or virtue”); MONTAGU, supra note 44, at 100 (“In 
every case [of using swear words] there is an emotional association of some sort. This 
emotional association is generally an intrinsic part of the meaning of the word itself or else 
is extrinsically given to it either directly or by implication, as in negative swearing.”). 
 78. See, e.g., State v. Vars, 237 P.3d 378, 381 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (“Washington 
common law has defined [open and obscene exposure] as ‘a lascivious exhibition of those 
private parts of the person which instinctive modesty, human decency, or common propriety 
require shall be customarily kept covered in the presence of others.’” (quoting State v. 
Galbreath, 419 P.2d 800, 803 (Wash. 1966))); Ardery v. State, 56 Ind. 328, 329–30 (1877) 
(“And it historically appears that the first most palpable piece of indecency in a human 
being was the public exposure of his or her, as now commonly called, privates . . . .”). 
 79. See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973) (describing material that 
states could prohibit as obscenity to include, as an example, “[p]atently offensive 
representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition 
of the genitals”). 
58 HOUS. L. REV. 401 (2020) 
414 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [58:2 
and portraying body parts and bodily functions.80 Similarly, 
profanity represents a desecration of religious ideals that 
segments of the public hold sacred.81 Names of holy figures in 
particular are often the subject of profane expressions.82 To 
profane those names is to demonstrate a disrespect and 
irreverence for deeply held moral beliefs. Therefore, the use of 
immoral language challenges fundamental moral beliefs and 
norms of society. 
To be clear, though, the reason that the public finds the use 
of this language to be inappropriate is not merely because the 
meaning suggests a viewpoint that contravenes established moral 
norms. Use of the language is inappropriate because of its crude 
and base portrayal of the meanings.83 Consider the vulgar 
reference to the idea of sexual intercourse—i.e., the F-word. The 
vulgar word portrays the concept of sex in a crude and base 
manner. The concept of sex is not considered inappropriate, but its 
crude and base portrayal is. Now suppose that a person were to 
state the following argument: “rape should be permissible.” 
Although the argument forwards a viewpoint that most would 
consider to be immoral, the language used to convey that 
argument is not crude or base. Stated another way, the idea that 
the language conveys is offensive, but the language itself is not. 
Hence, the offensiveness of immoral language does not merely 
reflect disagreement with an immoral idea, but rather, it stems 
from the manner in which the idea’s expression occurs—i.e., in a 
manner that is crude, coarse, and base. 
This premise for denying trademark protection—that the 
immoral language is highly offensive—is bolstered by the fact that 
those who use immoral language usually do so for the sole purpose 
of evoking emotion.84 Precisely because many members of the 
public take offense at the crudeness of immoral language do 
 
 80. See Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 517 (“As the Commission said with regard 
to expletive use of the F-Word, ‘the word’s power to insult and offend derives from its sexual 
meaning.’”); id. at 509 (defining F-word as a vulgar term meaning to copulate). 
 81. See MONTAGU, supra note 44, at 100–02. 
 82. See id. 
 83. Cf. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2309 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (arguing that offensiveness that results from scandalous marks 
“could result from the views expressed, but it could also result from the way in which those 
views are expressed: using a manner of expression that is ‘shocking to [one’s] sense 
of . . . decency,’ or ‘extremely offensive to the sense . . . of propriety’” (citation omitted)). 
 84. See MONTAGU, supra note 44, at 100. 
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speakers employ that language.85 Indeed, those speakers usually 
do not intend to refer specifically to the concepts that immoral 
language represents.86 Rather, they usually intend to invoke only 
the offensiveness that follows from the crude portrayal of those 
concepts.87 The offensiveness evokes emotion, which serves to 
emphasize the idea expressed. Even where the speaker does not 
intend to convey a critical meaning, the immoral language usually 
involves an attempt to invoke an offensive connotation that 
emphasizes the idea. For instance, consider the phrase F—ING 
GOOD CHICKEN! as a mark for a restaurant that serves chicken. 
Presumably, the speaker intends neither to communicate 
anything about the actual meaning of the F-word (sexual 
intercourse) nor anything critical of chickens. Instead, the speaker 
intends to communicate that the chicken tastes very good. The F-
word serves to grab the attention of readers owing to its inherent 
offensiveness. It adds offensive emotive force to the message.88 
This matters because it suggests that speakers employ vulgar, 
profane, and obscene expression for the specific purpose of 
invoking its offensive characteristic. Not only is the use of immoral 
language highly offensive to many in the public, its speakers 
intend it to be so. 
Thus, Congress should deny trademark protection for 
immoral language because the public finds that language to be 
highly offensive. Users of immoral language purposefully employ 
it to evoke its offensive connotation. In their exposure to 
trademarks, members of the public should not be subject to 
purposefully offensive language. 
B. Commercial Context 
There are many contexts that the law has reserved for using 
vulgar, profane, and even obscene language. Political gatherings,89 
 
 85. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2311 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (“The most obvious ways—indeed, perhaps the only conceivable ways—in which a 
trademark can be expressed in a shocking or offensive manner are when the speaker 
employs obscenity, vulgarity, or profanity.”). 
 86. See MONTAGU, supra note 44, at 100; Teresa Elizabeth Stone et al., Back to Swear 
One: A Review of English Language Literature on Swearing and Cursing in Western Health 
Settings, 25 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 65, 66 (2015) (“Swearwords are used primarily 
in a connotative way, referring to the emotional nuances commonly associated with 
swearing, whereas denotation refers to more literal meaning.” (citation omitted)). 
 87. See MONTAGU, supra note 44, at 93. 
 88. See id. at 100 (discussing “polite swearing”). 
 89. See sources cited supra note 71. 
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sporting events,90 television,91 and even the public square are only 
a few of the many contexts that allow for their use.92 So, for those 
who believe that morally offensive terminology is necessary to 
communicate emotive force, the law permits such language in 
certain situations. 
The forum of commercial advertising—and in particular 
trademarks—should not be one of those situations. Two reasons 
support this conclusion. First, the public prefers that businesses 
use non-offensive methods of expressing commercial 
information.93 Second, use of such language as trademarks hinders 
commercial activity.94 The Sections below discuss these two 
reasons. 
1. Offensive Methods of Communication. As discussed in 
Section III.A, much of the public prefers not to encounter offensive 
language. That preference matters a lot in the commercial realm. 
Within the commercial realm, the government may determine 
permissible methods for businesses to present their commercial 
advertising.95 Given that the purpose of commercial advertising is 
to attract consumers, the public expects the advertising to employ 
methods of advertising that are attractive, or at least non-
offensive.96 The public expects commercial advertisers to use 
means that do not offend the public sense of morality. Therefore, 
 
 90. See Lindsay H. Jones, Profanities Still Flying in NFL Games Despite Flags, USA 
TODAY: SPORTS (Oct. 11, 2014, 7:27 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2014/ 
10/11/profanity-language-penalties-officials/17120379/ [https://perma.cc/8RH5-3TDC]. But 
see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 36A (2020), https://malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/P 
artIV/TitleI/Chapter272/Section36A [https://perma.cc/BBV8-EVB2] (“Whoever, having 
arrived at the age of sixteen years, directs any profane, obscene or impure language or 
slanderous statement at a participant or an official in a sporting event, shall be punished 
by a fine of not more than fifty dollars.”). 
 91. See Sapolsky & Kaye, supra note 69, at 292–301. 
 92. E.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 569–70, 585–86 (2002) (enjoining 
enforcement of a statute prohibiting sexually oriented material on the internet and 
remanding); ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181, 206–07 (3d Cir. 2008) (striking down the 
statute as unconstitutional on remand). 
 93. See infra Section III.B.1. 
 94. See infra Section III.B.2. 
 95. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (regulating “commercial advertising” to avoid 
misrepresentations of goods). 
 96. This expectation is not the same as an expectation that ideas within 
advertisements be non-offensive or, in the words of Justice Alito, that trademarks consist 
only of “happy-talk” expression. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (plurality 
opinion). As discussed in Section III.B.1 below, a requirement that methods of 
communication be non-offensive is constitutionally distinct from a requirement that the 
ideas within the advertising be non-offensive. See discussion infra Section III.B.1. The 
latter requirement would be unconstitutionally viewpoint discriminatory; the former would 
not. 
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to meet that expectation, the law should not encourage highly 
offensive language in commercial advertising. 
Other contexts support the argument that the law should 
support the public’s preference for non-offensive methods of 
communicating commercial advertising. One example is 
computer-automated phone calls. Many members of the public 
prefer not to be bothered by a computer calling their cell phones 
and reciting commercial advertisements.97 Congress has therefore 
passed a law that prevents placing automated phone calls which 
advertise unsolicited commercial messages (or in other words, that 
engage in robocalling).98 That law carries a penalty of up to 
$1 million for a single violation, and the FCC is actively enforcing 
it.99 Another example is unsolicited commercial and pornographic 
e-mail, which most members of the public prefer not to receive. 
Congress enacted the CAN-SPAM Act, which imposes penalties of 
up to $43,280 per e-mail for sending unsolicited commercial or 
pornography e-mail (under certain conditions).100 In short, these 
modes of presenting commercial advertisements are offensive to 
members of the public, so Congress has acted to prevent them. 
Just as the public prefers not to receive robocalls and spam e-
mail, the public prefers not to receive advertisements through the 
method of highly offensive, immoral language. Like robocalls and 
spam e-mail, immoral language reflects a mode of communication 
that is independent of the specific message within the 
advertisement. When used merely to evoke emotional force—
which is usually the case—immoral language is not employed to 
convey a specific viewpoint.101 In that situation, the immoral 
language is used to gain attention.102 The mode is crude and base, 
which effectuates offense, emotion, and attention. The public, 
understandably, prefers not to receive this mode of expression. As 
 
 97. See Stop Unwanted Robocalls and Texts, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://www.fc 
c.gov/consumers/guides/stop-unwanted-robocalls-and-texts [https://perma.cc/YYD7-VGSX] 
(July 9, 2020) (“Unwanted calls[—]including illegal and spoofed robocalls[⏤]are the FCC’s 
top consumer complaint and our top consumer protection priority.”). 
 98. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B)–(C). 
 99. Id. § 227(b)(1)(B)–(C), (5)(A); see also The FCC’s Push to Combat Robocalls & 
Spoofing, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/spoofed-robocalls [https://perma.cc/ 
FEG6-CC98] (last visited Aug. 19, 2020). 
 100. 15 U.S.C. § 7706; CAN-SPAM Act: A Compliance Guide for Business, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/can-spam-act-complianc 
e-guide-business [https://perma.cc/5MQN-KB4R] (Jan. 1, 2020); see also Tracy McVeigh, 
Porn Spammers Jailed for Five Years, GUARDIAN (Oct. 14, 2007, 6:39 PM), https://www.theg 
uardian.com/technology/2007/oct/14/internet.crime [https://perma.cc/T8E3-7A8L]. 
 101. See MONTAGU, supra note 44, at 93, 100. 
 102. See id. 
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discussed below in Section III.C, denying a trademark is an 
effective means of limiting this mode in commercial advertising. 
Of course, bars to robocalls and spam e-mail are 
distinguishable on the grounds that they do not target the content 
of speech. The Supreme Court has recently held that robocall 
regulations that target messages in speech violate the First 
Amendment.103 However, this Section is not discussing the speech 
implications of a bar to immoral language. Part IV engages that 
discussion, and as discussed in Section IV.B, a bar to immoral 
language does not target any message or idea within speech. Here, 
I note merely that the offensiveness of being bothered by robocalls 
and spam e-mail illustrates limitations on acceptable modes of 
communication in advertising. Immoral language involves the 
same sort of offensiveness. 
2. Disruption to Commerce. Marks that contain immoral 
language are likely to disrupt the commercial marketplace. Their 
intrinsic offensiveness creates an atmosphere that is uninviting. 
As time continues without any bar to immoral language, 
businesses are likely to become more confident that immoral 
language is worthy of investment as a brand that grabs the 
attention of consumers. And trademarks are everywhere, so 
encounters with offensive marks would not be avoidable.104 Even 
if a person turns away from a mark, the trademark has already 
registered in the mind. The offense occurs. Consumers, in turn, 
feel less comfortable freely observing brands in the commercial 
marketplace. 
In view of the risk of being offended, some consumers may 
severely limit their exposure to trademarks, perhaps reducing 
their participation in the commercial marketplace wherever 
possible. Some may continue to view offensive marks but alter 
consumption choices. Some may not let offensive marks affect 
their consumption choices at all, perhaps being only mildly 
annoyed. And some may even appreciate the offensive language as 
 
 103. The recent case of Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., No. 19-631, slip op. 
at 25 (U.S. July 6, 2020), is consistent with this conclusion. In Barr, the Supreme Court 
held that a provision of the federal robocall statute violated the First Amendment—
specifically, the provision that exempted debt collection calls on behalf of the United States. 
See id. The Court explained that the law “favored debt-collection speech over [other] 
political speech,” so it was unconstitutional. Id. The proposal in this Article does not target 
the specific ideas or messages in speech, but instead, only the mode of expressing the 
message. See discussion infra Section IV.B.3 (explaining the distinction between targeting 
ideas and modes of expression). 
 104. See Ned Snow, Denying Trademark for Scandalous Speech, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
2331, 2362 (2018) [hereinafter Denying Trademark] (noting the ubiquity of trademarks). 
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a form of humor or entertainment. Of these various groups, those 
who act on their offense (by not participating or altering 
consumption choices) will negatively affect commercial activity.105 
Simply put, transactions that would have occurred will not. Of 
course, those who appreciate offensive marks might actually 
increase economic activity. Yet it seems unlikely that those 
consumers would cause a net gain for commercial activity in view 
of those consumers who decrease their activity because of their 
offense. In short, marks that contain offensive language would 
seem to diminish the robustness of commercial activity.106 The 
offense has occurred, so commerce will not. 
It is true that if consumers refuse to engage in commercial 
transactions because of offensive language, mark owners might 
change their marks, or alternatively, websites and stores might 
refuse to carry those goods with the offensive marks. Arguably the 
laissez-faire marketplace will resolve the problem of immoral 
language in marks.107 But this argument fails to recognize the 
practical reality that a sufficient number of consumers might (and 
likely will) consume products with marks containing immoral 
language. Even if those consumers comprise a minority of the 
public, the minority is likely sufficient to keep the mark owner in 
business. That being the case, consumers who find the language 
offensive will continue to encounter such marks without means for 
preventing exposure. Although they might not purchase the good 
or frequent the store, they will still see, hear, and read the 
advertisements potentially anywhere. The specific commercial 
experience becomes an unpleasant one. And as more businesses 
invest in immoral-language marks, offensive experiences will 
become a regular occurrence. Uninviting and offensive, the 
commercial marketplace will suffer. 
C. Trademark Law as a Deterrent 
To the extent that the law can prevent immoral language in 
trademarks, the law will do much to prevent immoral language in 
 
 105. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2307 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“These attention-grabbing words, though financially valuable to 
some businesses that seek to attract interest in their products, threaten to distract 
consumers and disrupt commerce.”). 
 106. See id. (“[Vulgar marks] may lead to the creation of public spaces that many will 
find repellant, perhaps on occasion creating the risk of verbal altercations or even physical 
confrontations.”). 
 107. See Denying Trademark, supra note 104, at 2367. 
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commercial advertising.108 The question that follows is whether 
denying trademark registration for immoral language will 
actually prevent people from using them as trademarks. The 
answer appears to be yes. Businesses have an incentive to use only 
those marks that can be registered for federal trademark 
protection.109 Registration ensures that other businesses will not 
pass themselves off as the mark owner.110 It facilitates effective 
brand marketing, leading to reputational value for the mark 
owner. Yet without trademark protection, a seller risks losing 
business to competitors who might copy the seller’s brand name. 
Therefore, businesses have a strong financial incentive to choose 
a mark for their goods or services that is eligible for trademark 
registration. Accordingly, Congress should deny registration for 
marks containing immoral language to place economic pressure on 
businesses not to use those marks. 
This premise that denying trademark would deter immoral 
language draws strength from both the purposes and doctrines of 
trademark law. That strength, however, is dependent on the 
timeliness of Congress’s action. Both these points are discussed in 
the two Sections below. 
1. Purposes and Doctrines of Trademark Law. The purposes 
that underlie trademark law support the purpose of denying 
protection for vulgar, profane, and obscene language. The general 
purpose of trademark law is to benefit consumers, and to further 
this general purpose, trademark law fulfills several specific 
purposes.111 First, it protects consumers from confusion about the 
source of a product. By providing a mark owner an exclusive mark, 
trademark enables consumers to easily and accurately identify a 
product’s brand.112 Second, it protects consumers from deceptive 
 
 108. In order to qualify for federal trademark protection, a trademark must be placed 
on the good or displayed in the advertising or sale of a service. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1127. 
 109. See generally USPTO, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., PROTECTING YOUR TRADEMARK: 
ENHANCING YOUR RIGHTS THROUGH FEDERAL REGISTRATION 11–12 (2020), https://w 
ww.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/BasicFacts.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6QU-EHH9] 
(explaining benefits of registering a trademark). 
 110. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (imposing liability on parties who infringe a 
registered mark). 
 111. See generally Ned Snow, Free Speech & Disparaging Trademarks, 57 B.C. L. REV. 
1639, 1668–70 (2016) [hereinafter Free Speech] (reciting various purposes of trademark 
law). 
 112. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 782 n.15 (1992) (Stevens, 
J., concurring) (quoting legislative history that articulates one purpose of trademark to be 
“protect[ing] the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a 
particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for 
and wants to get”). 
58 HOUS. L. REV. 401 (2020) 
2020] IMMORAL TRADEMARKS 421 
advertising. Marks that deceive consumers about characteristics 
of the product are denied protection.113 Third, it facilitates an 
incentive for businesses to offer products that consumers value. 
The trademark provides a means for businesses to gain a 
reputation as sponsors of a product. That reputation incentivizes 
businesses to offer quality products.114 
Consistent with these purposes of trademark law, denying 
protection for immoral language would also benefit consumers. 
Just as trademark law protects consumers from confusion over a 
product’s source and from deception about characteristics of goods, 
trademark law can protect consumers from highly offensive modes 
of advertising. For many consumers, protection from offensive 
language is at least as beneficial as protection from confusion or 
deception.115 Furthermore, incentivizing businesses to use non-
offensive modes of expression (by denying protection for immoral 
language) is analogous to incentivizing businesses to offer quality 
products to consumers: both incentives promote consumer 
satisfaction. Hence, denying protection for immoral language is 
consistent with the specific purposes of trademark law that 
ultimately benefit consumers. 
Specific provisions of the Lanham Act (the Act) further 
support denying protection for immoral language. The Lanham 
Act already denies trademark registration for certain categories of 
content on moral grounds. The Act denies protection for portrayals 
of a deceased president while the spouse is alive (without his or 
her consent).116 The reason for this denial would seem to be that 
the public considers it inappropriate to commercialize a deceased 
president while his or her spouse is still living. The president’s 
memory should not be commercialized, out of respect for the widow 
or widower.117 This is a moral reason. Similarly, the Act prevents 
 
 113. See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1844 (2007) (“By preserving the integrity of these symbols, trademark 
law benefits consumers . . . by protecting them from being deceived into buying products 
they do not want . . . .”). 
 114. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) 
(“[Trademark] law helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will 
reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product.”). 
 115. See Denying Trademark, supra note 104, at 2357, 2359, 2361. 
 116. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(c). 
 117. See Nicole Kinsley, The Federal Trademark Statute Assumes Hillary Can’t Win, 
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. (July 21, 2016), https://www.trademarkandcopyrightlawblog.c 
om/2016/07/the-federal-trademark-statute-assumes-hillary-cant-win/ [https://perma.cc/D6 
6T-8NC4]. Some might argue that the reason is to prevent consumers from being misled 
into believing that the deceased president had endorsed the good during his or her life. That 
reason, however, would not explain why the bar applies only during the life of the widow or 
widower. 
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registration of an insignia of the United States, any state, or any 
foreign nation.118 One court has noted the reason for this bar: 
government insignia “ought to be kept solely to signify the 
government and not to be sullied or debased by use as symbols of 
business and trade.”119 The use of government insignia as a 
trademark would sully or debase that insignia, which apparently 
should not be done.120 Here, again, is another moral reason.121 
Thus, the deceased-presidents bar and the government-insignia 
bar are both morally based bars to trademark protection. Bars to 
vulgar, profane, and obscene marks would not be the first, or the 
only, morally based bars. 
2. Timeliness of the Bars. The effectiveness of the law at 
limiting immoral language in trademarks will decrease as 
Congress procrastinates the enactment of this proposal. As 
discussed in Part IV below, the Supreme Court in 2019 struck 
down a century-old statutory provision that barred registration of 
marks that were “scandalous” or “immoral.”122 Those terms 
allowed the government to deny protection not only to the immoral 
language but also to specific ideas that the government considered 
to be immoral.123 The terms were thus held to be 
unconstitutional.124 Importantly, though, several members of the 
Court wrote separately to observe that Congress could bar 
protection for marks that are vulgar, profane, or obscene.125 The 
 
 118. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(b). 
 119. Renna v. County of Union, 88 F. Supp. 3d 310, 318 n.9 (D.N.J. 2014). 
 120. See id. 
 121. Some might argue that this reason for this bar is to protect people from being 
confused over whether the government endorses the good or service. That is possible, 
although not the view articulated by the Renna court quoted above. Furthermore, if that 
were the reason, the bar would have precluded protection only for parties who are not the 
government organization corresponding to the government insignia. But that is not so: the 
bar applies to government organizations as well. E.g., In re City of Houston, 731 F.3d 1326, 
1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (denying trademark protection for a city’s own government symbol); 
see also Rebecca Tushnet, The First Amendment Walks into a Bar: Trademark Registration 
and Free Speech, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 381, 409 n.106 (2016) (questioning deceptiveness 
as a reason for the government insignia bar given that the bar prohibits governments from 
registering their own insignia). 
 122. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2302 (2019); sources cited supra note 3. 
 123. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2299–2301. 
 124. Id. at 2302. 
 125. See id. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“[R]efusing registration to obscene, vulgar, or profane marks does not offend the First 
Amendment.”); id. (Alito, J., concurring) (“Our decision does not prevent Congress from 
adopting a more carefully focused statute that precludes the registration of marks 
containing vulgar terms that play no real part in the expression of ideas.”); id. at 2306 
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[I]t is hard to see how a statute 
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majority opinion explicitly noted that its holding did not reach 
such modes of expression.126 Hence, the Court sent a clear signal 
to Congress that it could—and perhaps should—bar protection for 
vulgar, profane, and obscene marks. 
Given the Court’s signal, one would expect Congress to 
quickly enact trademark bars for vulgar, profane, and obscene 
language. Indeed, for a century, Congress blocked such immoral 
language under the old “immoral” and “scandalous” bars, never 
hinting that it would remove those bars.127 So when the Court 
struck down those bars, one would have expected Congress to 
immediately fix the seeming technicality. One would have 
expected Congress to replace the old unconstitutional terms with 
the freshly endorsed constitutional terms: vulgar, profane, and 
obscene. But two years have passed since Brunetti and Congress 
has done nothing. Has Congress changed its mind about immoral 
language in trademarks? As time continues to pass, the question 
becomes more pressing. Congress’s continued silence after the 
Court’s explicit invitation to replace the old bars suggests that 
Congress no longer values non-offensive modes of expressing 
commercial information. Or perhaps it suggests that Congress no 
longer has a problem with immoral language. 
Whatever the reason that Congress delays, the passing of 
time creates an expectation on the part of businesses that use of 
immoral language is permissible for trademark registration. 
Expectations become settled, so businesses gain confidence to 
invest in marks containing immoral language. With the passage of 
time, businesses become confident that such marks are here to 
stay. And those marks will only continue to grab the attention of 
consumers. They are, therefore, likely to become more common as 
Congress postpones any action. Crude portrayals of concepts that 
contravene fundamental moral norms will become a part of the 
commercial marketplace. Unless Congress acts soon, civilized 
discourse will quickly erode. 
 
prohibiting the registration of only highly vulgar or obscene words discriminates based on 
‘viewpoint.’”); id. at 2318 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“With 
‘scandalous’ narrowed to reach only obscene, profane, and vulgar content, the provision 
would not be overly broad.”). 
 126. See id. at 2301–02, 2302 n.* (majority opinion). 
 127. See Trademark Act of 1905, Pub. L. No. 84, § 5(a), 33 Stat. 724, 725 (prohibiting 
trademark registration for scandalous or immoral matter), repealed by 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). 
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IV.CONSTITUTION 
The proposal that Congress enact bars to vulgar, profane, and 
obscene marks (VPO bars) raises an obvious question: Would the 
VPO bars violate the First Amendment?128 This question calls for 
both a doctrinal and theoretical discussion. The doctrinal 
discussion first considers whether denying trademark registration 
constitutes an act of speech suppression.129 Concluding that the 
denial is indeed an act of suppression, the discussion considers 
whether an exceptional speech doctrine could justify the VPO bars. 
Specifically, does the context of trademark registration suggest 
the application of the limited public forum doctrine?130 Section 
IV.A takes up these two issues. Section IV.B focuses on the single 
issue of whether the VPO bars would be viewpoint-neutral—a 
critical requirement in most First Amendment contexts. 
Viewpoint neutrality merits close attention in light of the two 
recent Supreme Court cases mentioned above—Matal v. Tam131 
and Iancu v. Brunetti.132 Section IV.B analyzes those cases. Section 
IV.C then observes recent remarks made by Justices relating to 
the constitutionality of the VPO bars, specifically. Finally, this 
Part engages a theoretical discussion in Section IV.D, considering 
whether the VPO bars would be consistent with the theory that 
underlies free speech. 
A. Doctrinal Framework 
Any government restriction that discriminates on the content 
of speech presumptively represents Congress “abridging the 
freedom of speech,” in direct violation of the First Amendment.133 
The doctrine is simple: the government “has no power to restrict 
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or 
its content.”134 Thus, the question here is whether Congress is 
 
 128. Professor Gary Myers has examined this question as well. See Gary Myers, It's 
Scandalous! – Limiting Profane Trademark Registrations after Tam and Brunetti, 27 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 10–19 (2019). He has concluded that a statutory bar to vulgar, profane, 
and obscene marks would not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 19–20. 
 129. See discussion infra Section IV.A.1. 
 130. See discussion infra Section IV.A.2. 
 131. 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757–58 (2017). 
 132. 139 S. Ct. at 2299–2302 (2019). 
 133. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also cases cited infra note 134. 
 134. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (quoting Police Dep’t of Chi. 
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)); see also Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790–
91 (2011); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State 
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the 
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restricting expression because of its message, ideas, subject, or 
content when Congress denies trademark registration for vulgar, 
profane, or obscene marks. 
1. Act of Abridgment. This question raises a preliminary 
issue that the recent Court cases appear to have settled—i.e., 
whether denying trademark registration constitutes an act of 
abridgement. By denying registration, the government does not 
preclude anyone from using any sort of expression as a mark.135 
That is, in the absence of registration, a seller who uses a mark to 
represent her products can continue to do so; she merely cannot 
prevent someone else from duplicating the same mark. The seller 
is in no way prohibited from using the mark. Although the effect 
of denying registration may be to deprive the seller of the economic 
benefit that follows from trademark protection, trademark law 
does not directly preclude the seller from using any sort of 
expression as a mark. On this basis, it is arguable that denying 
registration does not abridge any speech. The speech can still 
occur. 
For several decades, appellate courts employed this reasoning 
to hold that content-based restrictions on trademark registration 
did not raise any speech issue.136 Without an abridgment, any sort 
of discrimination would not matter. But in the two recent cases of 
Iancu v. Brunetti137 and Matal v. Tam,138 the Court’s holdings 
imply otherwise. In both cases, the Court struck down content-
based bars to trademark registration on First Amendment 
grounds (which will be discussed in greater detail below in Section 
 
First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea 
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” (quoting United 
States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990))). 
 135. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (setting forth requirements for trademark registration); 
Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Whether such marks can be registered does not affect the extent to which their owners 
may use them in commerce to identify goods. No speech is being restricted; no one is being 
punished.”). 
 136. See In re Boulevard Ent., Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (following 
precedent that “rejected First Amendment challenges to refusals to register marks under 
[S]ection 1052(a), holding that the refusal to register a mark does not proscribe any conduct 
or suppress any form of expression because it does not affect the applicant’s right to use the 
mark in question”), abrogated by Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2302; In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 
33 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that the scandalous and immoral bars do not 
abridge a trademark applicant’s speech rights on the grounds that “[n]o conduct is 
proscribed, and no tangible form of expression is suppressed”), abrogated by Brunetti, 139 
S. Ct. at 2302; In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (employing the same 
reasoning as the court in Mavety Media Grp.), abrogated by Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2302. 
 137. 139 S. Ct. at 2302. 
 138. 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017). 
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IV.B). Although in neither case did the Court ever explicitly state 
that the bars served to suppress or abridge the speech of mark 
owners, the Court’s holdings in both cases—that the bars violated 
the First Amendment—require that conclusion. How else could 
the bars have violated the First Amendment other than through 
an act of speech suppression? Hence, the issue is settled: content 
bars to trademark registration have an effect on speech sufficient 
to trigger First Amendment interests. 
From a practical standpoint, this implied holding of Brunetti 
and Tam makes sense. Simply put, denying the economic benefit 
of trademark rights chills the exercise of speech. Potential mark 
owners avoid speaking marks that would not be eligible for those 
rights. Indeed, the very purpose of denying registration for 
immoral language—to prevent mark owners from using those 
sorts of marks—necessarily implies that the government is 
attempting to restrict speech based on content. A speech 
abridgment is definitely occurring. 
2. Justifications for Content Restrictions. The blanket 
statement that Congress “has no power to restrict expression 
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content” 
is not without exception.139 Viewed under a standard of “strict 
scrutiny,” government restrictions of speech content are 
permissible if narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government 
interest,140 such as “protecting the physical and psychological well-
being of minors”141 or protecting national security.142 Under this 
standard, however, the VPO bars would not likely pass 
constitutional muster. The government’s interest in ensuring that 
consumers are not offended by immoral language does not seem 
compelling. There is no demonstrable harm to consumers—just 
the inconvenience of avoiding certain marks.143 
Perhaps, though, the bars serve a compelling government 
interest because they protect the psychological well-being of 
 
 139. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226. 
 140. Id. at 2226–27. 
 141. See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“We have 
recognized that there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological 
well-being of minors.”). 
 142. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307–08 (1981). 
 143. Cf. Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The purpose 
for which the trademark law accords merchants the exclusive right to the use of a name or 
symbol in their area or commerce is identification, so that the merchants can establish 
goodwill for their goods based on past satisfactory performance, and the consuming public 
can rely on a mark as a guarantee that the goods or services so marked come from the 
merchant who has been found to be satisfactory in the past.”). 
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children. Trademarks are basically everywhere,144 and at least 
with respect to obscene marks that are pornographic in nature, 
courts,145 legal scholars,146 and social scientists147 agree that 
pornographic material causes serious harms to the psychological 
wellness of children. Yet even assuming a compelling interest, the 
VPO bars would not appear narrowly tailored to serve that 
interest.148 The law could still provide protection for marks 
containing immoral language by limiting the protection to certain 
contexts that children do not usually frequent (e.g., adult-media 
stores and websites). Or alternatively, the law could deny 
protection only for the specific contexts where children are likely 
to view marks (e.g., children’s toys). Under strict scrutiny, the 
broad reach of the VPO bars does not seem justifiable. 
That the VPO bars cannot satisfy the strict-scrutiny standard 
does not imply their unconstitutionality. There are many content-
based restrictions in trademark law that are likely not justified 
under the strict-scrutiny standard.149 Yet those other content-
based restrictions must be constitutional if the trademark system 
 
 144. See Denying Trademark, supra note 104, at 2362. 
 145. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–51 (1978) (upholding 
regulation of constitutionally protected indecent speech over broadcast airwaves on 
grounds that “a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans” and, moreover, 
“broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children”). 
 146. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 
589, 601–02 (“All of these factors support the conclusion that pornography is a significant 
social problem—producing serious harm, mostly to women—and that substantial benefits 
would result if the pornography industry were regulated.”). 
 147. See, e.g., Michael Flood, The Harms of Pornography Exposure Among Children 
and Young People, 18 CHILD ABUSE REV. 384, 391–93 (2009); Kirk Doran & Joseph Price, 
Pornography and Marriage, 35 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 489, 495–96 (2014) (finding that 
the use of pornographic material is associated with less marital satisfaction and 
summarizing other research on pornography’s effect on marriages and families); Destin N. 
Stewart & Dawn M. Szymanski, Young Adult Women’s Reports of Their Male Romantic 
Partner’s Pornography Use as a Correlate of Their Self-Esteem, Relationship Quality, and 
Sexual Satisfaction, 67 SEX ROLES 257, 257 (2012) (“Results [of the survey] revealed 
women’s reports of their male partner’s frequency of pornography use were negatively 
associated with their relationship quality. More perceptions of problematic use of 
pornography was negatively correlated with self-esteem, relationship quality, and sexual 
satisfaction.”); Valerie Voon et al., Neural Correlates of Sexual Cue Reactivity in Individuals 
with and Without Compulsive Sexual Behaviours, PLOS ONE (July 11, 2014), https://journal 
s.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0102419&type=printable [https://pe 
rma.cc/5KTQ-KTAX] (conducting empirical study demonstrating that brain activity of 
pornography users is akin to drug addicts). 
 148. Perhaps, though, such a bar would be narrowly tailored. Professor Gary Myers 
has compared the VPO bars to indecent-speech regulation by the FCC, which the Court has 
held to be constitutional in FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). See Myers, supra note 128, 
at 18. 
 149. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (listing criteria for trademark registration that are based 
on the content of a mark). 
58 HOUS. L. REV. 401 (2020) 
428 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [58:2 
is to work.150 Consider the bars to registering marks that are 
deceptive,151 that are descriptive of goods,152 that are so similar to 
an existing mark that they are likely to cause confusion or 
mistakes among consumers,153 or that falsely suggest a connection 
with persons.154 These content-based bars facilitate truthful 
advertising and efficiency in the commercial marketplace.155 
Trademark could not fulfill its purposes without them. 
Unsurprisingly, then, some members of the Court have explicitly 
recognized that some content-based criteria in trademark law 
must be constitutional.156 Nevertheless, the Court has not yet 
delineated the proper test for evaluating whether content-based 
restrictions in the trademark context are permissible under the 
First Amendment.157 In short, content-based restrictions must be 
permissible in trademark law; the Court simply has not explained 
the correct analytical framework that would justify the 
restrictions. 
Although the Court has not definitively set forth the proper 
framework, Justices Alito, Sotomayor, and Breyer have suggested 
that the appropriate framework might be the limited-public-forum 
 
 150. See Free Speech, supra note 111, at 1647–61 (arguing that restrictions in 
trademark law must fall within an exception that allows for content discrimination). 
 151. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), invalidated in part by Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 
(2019); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
 152. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e). The descriptive bar applies only if the mark has not become 
distinctive. See id. § 1052(f). 
 153. Id. § 1052(d). 
 154. Id. § 1052(a), invalidated in part by Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2294; Tam, 137 S. Ct. 
at 1744. 
 155. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of 
Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 267, 276–77 (1988) (“The overall conclusion is 
that trademark law . . . can best be explained on the hypothesis that the law is trying to 
promote economic efficiency.”). 
 156. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2306 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“[R]egulations governing trademark registration ‘inevitably involve content 
discrimination.’” (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234–35 (2015) (Breyer, 
J., concurring))); Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1768 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in judgment) (recognizing that it is well settled that certain content-based criteria for 
trademark registration is constitutional). 
 157. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2298–99 (recognizing that the Tam Court could not 
agree on whether a bar in the Lanham Act constitutes “a condition on a government benefit 
or a simple restriction on speech,” such that the Court could not reach consensus on “the 
overall framework for deciding the case,” and deciding Brunetti on the same grounds as 
Tam). 
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doctrine.158 They appear correct.159 The limited-public-forum 
doctrine applies when evaluating government restrictions on 
speech that occurs within a forum that the government has 
created to facilitate private speech for certain purposes.160 In that 
context, content discrimination is permissible if the restrictions 
are viewpoint-neutral and “reasonable in light of the purpose 
served by the forum.”161 For example, a public library might 
designate a room for discussing the works of Mark Twain at a 
particular time. The room is a government forum intended to 
facilitate private speech. The content restriction—only speech 
about Mark Twain—serves a purpose of the library—to provide 
educational opportunities about authors—and it is viewpoint-
neutral—any opinion about Mark Twain is welcome. Importantly, 
the limited-public-forum doctrine is not limited only to physical 
fora. The doctrine may apply to metaphysical fora, or in other 
words, it may apply where the government has expended benefits 
or resources that further private speech.162 For example, the Court 
has applied this doctrine when it has evaluated school funding for 
a student publication that is conditioned on content-based 
restrictions,163 and a school’s provision of resources for a student 
organization that is conditioned on content-based restrictions.164 
Thus, the limited-public-forum doctrine allows for content-based 
restrictions on private speech where the government has expended 
resources to facilitate the speech, insofar as the restrictions are 
viewpoint-neutral and serve a purpose for expending the 
resources. 
 
 158. See id. at 2305 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“But one 
can find some vague resemblance between trademark registration and what this Court 
refers to as a ‘limited public forum’ created by the government for private speech.”); id. at 
2316 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he Court has treated 
such initiatives as a limited public (or nonpublic) forum.”); Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1763 
(plurality opinion) (“Potentially more analogous [to speech restrictions in the Lanham Act] 
are cases in which a unit of government creates a limited public forum for private speech.”). 
 159. See Denying Trademark, supra note 104, at 2364–65 (arguing that trademark 
restrictions fall within the doctrine of limited public forum). 
 160. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) 
(“The necessities of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it 
was created may justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of 
certain topics.”). 
 161. See id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 
806 (1985)). 
 162. See id. at 830. 
 163. See id. at 829–31. 
 164. See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 672–73 (2010). 
58 HOUS. L. REV. 401 (2020) 
430 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [58:2 
This doctrine appears applicable to the context of trademark 
registration.165 Through the registration process, the government 
extends enforceable property rights to persons who register their 
marks.166 The provision of enforceable rights is intended to 
facilitate private speech in the form of trademarks.167 
Furthermore, the Court has noted that where the government “is 
dangling the carrot of subsidy, not wielding the stick of 
prohibition,” the restriction is more likely to be viewed within the 
framework of a limited public forum.168 This point is, of course, 
relevant because trademark registration represents a government 
reward that only indirectly influences speech—not a criminal or 
financial punishment. Thus, the limited-public-forum doctrine 
appears the correct framework for analyzing content-based 
restrictions in trademark registration. 
This conclusion that the limited-public-forum doctrine applies 
to trademark is especially important in evaluating the VPO bars 
in light of a particular Supreme Court case, Cohen v. California. 
There, a man was criminally prosecuted for wearing a jacket 
containing the phrase “F— the Draft” in a state courthouse.169 In 
holding that the state had violated his First Amendment right, the 
Court noted that “words are often chosen as much for their emotive 
as their cognitive force.”170 Cohen thus recognizes protection for 
the F-word. But as Justice Sotomayor pointed out in her Brunetti 
opinion, the context of Cohen is very different from the context of 
trademark registration.171 A criminal prosecution for speaking a 
profanity in a courthouse about a government policy is very 
different from a denial of trademark registration for speaking the 
 
 165. See Denying Trademark, supra note 104, at 2364–68 (arguing that trademark 
system constitutes a limited public forum for purposes of evaluating speech restrictions). 
But see Lisa P. Ramsey, A Free Speech Right to Trademark Protection?, 106 TRADEMARK 
REP. 797, 877‒78 (2016) (concluding that bars to trademark registration should not be 
analyzed under a public-forum framework). 
 166. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1753 (2017) (listing benefits of trademark 
registration). 
 167. The private speech consists of names of marks that will enable consumers to 
identify the brand of good or service. See discussion supra Section III.C.1 (explaining the 
purpose of trademark law). 
 168. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 682–83 (2010) (noting that the 
subsidy nature of a school’s provision of resources for a student organization supported the 
analytical framework of a limited public forum). 
 169. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971). 
 170. Id. at 26. 
 171. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2314‒15 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
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same profanity in commercial advertising.172 Speech restrictions 
in Cohen would, under today’s doctrine, be subject to strict 
scrutiny, whereas speech restrictions in the trademark context 
should be subject to the standards of a limited public forum.173 
As mentioned above, the limited-public-forum doctrine 
requires, first, that content restrictions be reasonable in light of 
the trademark system’s purpose, and second, that the restrictions 
be viewpoint-neutral.174 With regard to the requirement of 
reasonableness, as discussed in Part III above, the VPO bars 
would reduce instances of public offense at modes of expression.175 
Such offenses can impede commercial transactions in the 
marketplace, which can undermine stability and orderliness in the 
commercial marketplace.176 Simply put, highly offensive language 
can make the commercial marketplace less inviting to the 
public.177 Marks containing offensive language disrupt commercial 
activity.178 Barring them is therefore a reasonable act by Congress 
in light of the trademark system’s broad purpose of facilitating 
commercial activity. The VPO bars thus satisfy the limited-public-
forum doctrine’s requirement of reasonableness. 
With regard to the doctrine’s requirement of viewpoint 
neutrality, Section IV.B below discusses that issue. 
B. Viewpoint Neutrality 
Content discrimination targets either the content’s general 
subject matter or its specific viewpoint.179 Discrimination based on 
the subject matter occurs when the restriction targets a broad, 
general category of expression, whereas viewpoint discrimination 
occurs “when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or 
perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction,”180 or 
 
 172. Id. at 2314‒17 (contrasting the Cohen Court’s condemnation of the F-word as 
viewpoint-neutral content discrimination with regulation against its use in the trademark 
context under the limited-public-forum doctrine). 
 173. Compare id., with Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (“Laws that 
burden political speech are ‘subject to strict scrutiny’ . . . .”). 
 174. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) 
(quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)). 
 175. See discussion supra Section III.B.2. 
 176. See Denying Trademark, supra note 104, at 2364–68 (arguing that offense at 
marks impedes the purposes of trademark law). 
 177. Id. at 2353–61. 
 178. See id. 
 179. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (defining viewpoint discrimination as blatantly 
occurring “[w]hen the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken 
by speakers on a subject”). 
 180. Id. 
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in other words, when the government “give[s] one side of a 
debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to 
the people.”181 
Under this understanding, the VPO bars would not be 
viewpoint-discriminatory. They do not target any particular 
opinion or ideology of a speaker, but rather, they target the general 
category of words that are highly offensive to the public’s sense of 
morality.182 The bars discriminate against vulgar, profane, or 
obscene language without regard for any viewpoint that a speaker 
may be asserting through such language.183 Hence, on their face, 
the VPO bars would seem to be viewpoint-neutral. 
Although this analysis may seem straightforward, the issue 
of viewpoint neutrality is especially nuanced in the trademark 
context. In the recent cases of Tam and Brunetti, the Court struck 
down content-based bars to trademark registration that were 
based on moral considerations.184 Both cases provide guidance on 
viewpoint discrimination in the context of content-based 
trademark bars.185 Hence, Tam and Brunetti must be studied 
closely to understand whether bars to vulgar, profane, and obscene 
marks would be subject to the same viewpoint-discriminatory 
failing. 
1. Matal v. Tam. In Tam, Mr. Simon Tam chose “The Slants” 
as his band name in order to “reclaim” or “take ownership” of 
stereotypes associated with persons of Asian descent.186 Mr. Tam 
accordingly applied to register THE SLANTS as a federally 
protected trademark.187 In response, the PTO found that the term 
was offensive to Asians and thereby denied Mr. Tam’s application 
for registration under the disparagement bar.188 The Supreme 
Court, however, unanimously concluded that the disparagement 
bar was viewpoint-discriminatory in violation of the First 
Amendment.189 
 
 181. McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 482–83 (2014). 
 182. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2313–15 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“A restriction on trademarks featuring obscenity, vulgarity, 
or profanity is similarly viewpoint neutral, though it is naturally content-based.”). 
 183. See, e.g., id. at 2308. 
 184. See id. at 2298, 2302; Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763–65 (2017) (plurality 
opinion). 
 185. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2298–2300; Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1753, 1763 (plurality 
opinion). 
 186. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1754. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 1751, 1753, 1765, 1769. 
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Although the Court overwhelmingly reached the conclusion 
that the disparagement bar was viewpoint-discriminatory, that 
conclusion is, in one sense, puzzling. The disparagement bar did 
not appear to target any specific ideology, opinion, or perspective 
of the speaker.190 It did not give a particular side an advantage in 
a public debate, applying equally to all debates—neither side was 
allowed to disparage.191 Justice Alito wrote a plurality opinion that 
recognized this fact, specifically noting: “[T]he [disparagement] 
clause evenhandedly prohibits disparagement of all groups. It 
applies equally to marks that damn Democrats and Republicans, 
capitalists and socialists, and those arrayed on both sides of every 
possible issue.”192 So, if the disparagement bar did not target any 
specific viewpoint, how could it be viewpoint-discriminatory? 
Justice Alito answered the question by explaining: 
Giving offense is a viewpoint. 
 We have said time and again that “the public expression 
of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are 
themselves offensive to some of their hearers.” Street v. New 
York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969). See also Texas v. Johnson, 
491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle 
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government 
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because 
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable”).193 
According to Justice Alito, then, “[g]iving offense is a viewpoint.”194 
But this statement should not be read in a vacuum. It does not 
mean that any and all means of being offensive constitutes a 
viewpoint. Rather, it means that speaking an offensive idea is a 
viewpoint. 
The necessity of offending through an idea is apparent in the 
sentences that Justice Alito quotes after making this giving-
offense statement. Specifically, Justice Alito quoted two prior 
statements by the Court: first, “the public expression of ideas may 
not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive 
to some of their hearers”;195 and second, “the government may not 
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the 
idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”196 In both statements, the 
 
 190. Free Speech, supra note 111, at 1677–83. 
 191. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1763 (plurality opinion). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. (citations omitted). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)). 
 196. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)). 
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Court made clear that the cause of the offense must be the idea 
itself that the content communicates. Hence, the offense that Alito 
characterized as a viewpoint must be the offense that arises in 
response to the idea directly communicated by the expression. 
Marks that disparage cause such offense. Disparaging marks 
are those that offend through their ideas.197 That is, people take 
offense because of the disparaging idea that the mark 
communicates.198 Indeed, the disparaging examples that Justice 
Alito cited as viewpoint-discriminatory exemplify targeting an 
idea within the disparaging mark: “Down with racists,” “Down 
with sexists,” and “Down with homophobes.”199 The ideas in these 
examples consist of putting down racists, sexists, and 
homophobes. Those ideas are offensive to those groups. 
A concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy supports this 
understanding. According to Justice Kennedy, the test for 
viewpoint discrimination turns on whether “the government has 
singled out a subset of messages for disfavor based on the views 
expressed.”200 Viewpoint discrimination must be “based on the 
views expressed,” or in other words, based on the ideas within the 
expression. To speak disparaging ideas is to speak a viewpoint, so 
the disparagement bar singles out speech based on an expressed 
view. Like Justice Alito, Justice Kennedy explained viewpoint 
discrimination in terms of targeting ideas within expression. 
Another fact that explains the Tam holding of viewpoint 
discrimination is the broad scope of the disparagement bar. 
Because it applied to all disparaging content, it was impossible to 
fully enforce.201 As a result, its application became “highly 
subjective,” entirely based on PTO officers’ opinions about what is 
inappropriately critical and what is not.202 The bar enabled the 
PTO to pick and choose among competing ideas.203 Hence, the 
general term disparage—without any stated viewpoint bias—
enabled the government to target particular opinions and 
viewpoints. 
The takeaway from Tam, then, is twofold. First, a bar to 
registration cannot be based on the offensiveness of an idea in a 
 
 197. See id. 
 198. See id. 
 199. Id. at 1765. 
 200. Id. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 201. See, e.g., Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1891 (2018) (illustrating 
that broad, “indeterminate” restrictions are more difficult to uphold than narrower 
restrictions). 
 202. Id. at 1756 n.5. 
 203. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1753–54. 
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mark. Second, a restriction cannot be so broad as to permit 
subjective enforcement against particular ideas. Accordingly, 
these principles must be applied to the VPO bars to determine 
their viewpoint neutrality. That application is set forth below in 
Section IV.B.3. 
2. Iancu v. Brunetti. In Iancu v. Brunetti, a business owner 
applied to register a mark that closely resembled the F-word as a 
brand name for his clothing line.204 The PTO denied his application 
under the Lanham Act’s bar that precluded registration of terms 
that were “immoral” or “scandalous.”205 Reversing the PTO, the 
Court struck down these bars as viewpoint-discriminatory.206 
a. Immoral Bar. All nine members of the Court agreed that 
the “immoral” bar was viewpoint-discriminatory in violation of the 
First Amendment.207 Writing the Court’s opinion, Justice Kagan 
explained: 
[T]he Lanham Act permits registration of marks that 
champion society’s sense of rectitude and morality, but not 
marks that denigrate those concepts. . . . [T]he statute, on its 
face, distinguishes between two opposed sets of ideas: those 
aligned with conventional moral standards and those hostile 
to them; those inducing societal nods of approval and those 
provoking offense and condemnation. The statute favors the 
former, and disfavors the latter.208 
As the Court made clear here, the immoral bar enabled, and 
indeed required, the government to pass judgment on whether 
particular ideas were morally acceptable. Stated differently, the 
immoral bar required the government to suppress ideas (by 
denying trademark registration) that it deemed inappropriate. 
This, according to the Court, was viewpoint-discriminatory.209 
Like the disparagement bar, the immoral bar did not specify 
which particular beliefs were immoral.210 The immoral bar did not 
target any specific ideology, specific opinion, or specific 
 
 204. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019). 
 205. Id. at 2298. 
 206. Id. at 2297. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 2299–2300. 
 209. See id. at 2300. 
 210. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2018), invalidated in part by Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2294 
(“No trademark . . . shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its 
nature unless it—(a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or 
matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, 
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols . . . .”). 
58 HOUS. L. REV. 401 (2020) 
436 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [58:2 
perspective.211 Nevertheless, the immoral bar enabled the 
government to target only the specific views that it found 
unacceptable.212 It mandated enforcement against specific 
viewpoints, akin to a restriction against any idea with which the 
government disagreed.213 In the wake of Tam, the immoral bar 
was inevitably viewpoint-discriminatory.214 
Underlying the Court’s condemnation of the immoral bar was 
another problematic aspect—vagueness. Although the Court did 
not invoke the vagueness doctrine, the fact that the bar enabled 
government officials to pick and choose which beliefs were 
acceptable suggested vagueness problems.215 The bar failed to 
provide notice about which types of marks were immoral, and it 
impermissibly delegated policy matters for subject determination 
by the PTO.216 In effect, then, its vagueness enabled viewpoint 
discrimination.217 
b. Scandalous Bar. The Brunetti Court split over whether 
the scandalous bar was viewpoint-discriminatory.218 Writing for 
five other Justices (i.e., Justices Alito, Thomas, Gorsuch, 
Kavanaugh, and Ginsburg), Justice Kagan interpreted scandalous 
as having an overlapping meaning with immoral, such that it also 
required the PTO to judge whether a mark’s idea or viewpoint was 
acceptable.219 The majority interpreted scandalous and immoral as 
“overlapping terms” that should be read together to arrive at a 
 
 211. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2300–01. 
 212. See id. (noting examples of ideas that the PTO approved for trademark 
registration and contrasting ideas that the PTO refused). 
 204. See id. (“The facial viewpoint bias in the law results in viewpoint-discriminatory 
application.”). 
 214. Id. at 2301. 
 215. See generally Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108‒09 (1972) 
(explaining the dangers of a vague statute). Why did the Brunetti Court not invoke the 
vagueness doctrine? The answer could be that the Court is generally reluctant where the 
government act constitutes an economic subsidy for speech. See Nat’l Endowment for Arts 
v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 589 (1998) (“In the context of selective subsidies, it is not always 
feasible for Congress to legislate with clarity. Indeed, if this statute is unconstitutionally 
vague, then so too are all Government programs awarding scholarships and grants on the 
basis of subjective criteria such as ‘excellence.’”). 
 216. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2298; cf. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108‒09. 
 217. Cf. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1341–43 (Fed. Cir. 2015), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 1744 
(2017) (recognizing that the vagueness of the disparagement bar “contributes significantly 
to the chilling effect on speech”). 
 218. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2294 (“Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. Chief 
Justice Roberts filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Breyer 
filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Sotomayor, joined by 
Justice Breyer, filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.”). 
 219. See id. at 2299–2300. 
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single meaning—ideas that are hostile to moral standards.220 For 
the majority, the scandalous and immoral terms thus constituted 
a single bar to registration.221 The majority regarded scandalous—
like immoral—as a term that called for a judgment about actual 
ideas within a mark.222 It was, therefore, viewpoint-
discriminatory.223 
Justices Sotomayor, Breyer, and Roberts interpreted 
scandalous very differently. Although each wrote separately, all 
three Justices together reached the same basic interpretation of 
scandalous. They interpreted scandalous as not requiring an 
assessment of an idea contained within a mark, but rather, as 
requiring an assessment of only the mode of expression.224 A mode 
of expression is the way or manner of expressing an idea.225 The 
Court had previously recognized that “[n]othing in the 
Constitution prohibits the [government] from insisting that 
certain modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to 
sanctions.”226 According to the dissenting Justices, scandalous 
may be interpreted to refer to modes of expressing an idea; 
specifically, the modes of “obscenity, vulgarity, and profanity.”227 
 
 220. Id. at 2300 (“Put the pair of overlapping terms together and the statute, on its 
face, distinguishes between two opposed sets of ideas: those aligned with conventional 
moral standards and those hostile to them; those inducing societal nods of approval and 
those provoking offense and condemnation.”). 
 221. See id. at 2299–2300. 
 222. See id. at 2300. Justice Kagan provided a simple example to illustrate the point: 
the marks LOVE RULES and ALWAYS BE GOOD as contrasted with the marks HATE 
RULES and ALWAYS BE CRUEL. Id. The PTO would judge the ideas expressed in the 
first two marks to be moral and the ideas expressed in the second two marks to be immoral. 
See id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. See id. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Standing alone, the term ‘scandalous’ need not be understood to reach marks that offend 
because of the ideas they convey; it can be read more narrowly to bar only marks that offend 
because of their mode of expression . . . .”); id. at 2304 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“[W]e should interpret the word ‘scandalous’ in the present statute to 
refer only to certain highly ‘vulgar’ or ‘obscene’ modes of expression.”); id. at 2308–11 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing that scandalous “can 
be read narrowly (to cover only offensive modes of expression)”). 
 225. Mode, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining mode as “a manner 
of . . . doing something”). 
 226. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). 
 227. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2308 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (interpreting scandalous “to address only obscenity, vulgarity, and profanity”); id. 
at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that 
scandalous can be interpreted to apply to only marks “that are obscene, vulgar, or profane”); 
id. at 2304 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (interpreting scandalous 
as referring to certain marks that are “highly ‘vulgar’ or ‘obscene’”). 
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Responding to this argument, the Brunetti majority rejected 
this argument that scandalous targets only modes of expressing 
ideas.228 In the majority’s view, the Lanham Act did not clearly 
limit scandalous only to modes that are offensive, independent of 
any viewpoint contained in a mark.229 For the majority, scandalous 
included both the modes of expression and the ideas that are 
offensive.230 
The upshot of Brunetti, then, is that where a bar to 
registration requires the PTO to pass judgment on an idea 
contained within a mark, that bar is viewpoint-discriminatory.231 
As a corollary to this principle, the Court implicitly recognized that 
restrictions on modes of expression do not require the PTO to pass 
judgment on an idea within a mark.232 The next Section applies 
these principles to the VPO bars. 
3. VPO Bars. A surface understanding of Tam and Brunetti 
might suggest that the VPO bars are viewpoint-discriminatory. 
The Tam Court condemned a bar that restricted offensive 
marks,233 and the VPO bars target vulgar, profane, and obscene 
marks specifically because they are so offensive.234 As Alito noted, 
“[g]iving offense is a viewpoint.”235 At first glance, then, the highly 
offensive nature of vulgar, profane, and obscene marks would 
seem to represent a protected viewpoint. Likewise, Brunetti 
condemned bars that denied protection based on a view that 
certain marks were immoral,236 and the VPO bars deny protection 
based on the view that vulgar, profane, and obscene marks are 
immoral.237 Thus, if construed in this way, Tam and Brunetti 
would imply the unconstitutionality of the VPO bars. 
But of course, construing Tam and Brunetti in this way would 
not be correct. As discussed in the Section above, Tam teaches that 
viewpoint discrimination exists where a bar restricts a mark 
 
 228. Id. at 2302 n.*. 
 229. Id. at 2301–02, 2302 n.*. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See id. at 2300–02. 
 232. See id. at 2301–02, 2302 n.*. 
 233. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (“Speech may not be banned on 
the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”). 
 234. See discussion supra Part III (arguing that trademark registration should be 
denied for vulgar, profane, and obscene marks specifically because they are highly offensive 
to the general public). 
 235. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1763 (plurality opinion). 
 236. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2300–01. 
 237. See discussion supra Section III.A (observing the general opinion that use of 
vulgar, profane, and obscene language is immoral). 
58 HOUS. L. REV. 401 (2020) 
2020] IMMORAL TRADEMARKS 439 
owner’s ability to speak critically of an idea (because the bar 
targets offensive ideas).238 It further teaches that viewpoint 
discrimination exists where the subject matter of the bar is so 
broad that it invites subjective application, such that the PTO 
picks which ideas should win in the marketplace.239 Brunetti 
teaches that viewpoint discrimination exists where a bar requires 
the PTO to pass judgment on an idea.240 Thus, under these 
principles that underlie the holdings of Tam and Brunetti, the 
constitutional questions relevant to the VPO bars are the 
following: (1) whether the VPO bars target ideas that are 
offensive; and (2) whether the VPO bars invite the PTO to apply 
its own judgment about whether an idea is unacceptable. As 
discussed below, the answers to these questions indicate that the 
VPO bars are not viewpoint-discriminatory. 
Question 1 
Do the VPO bars target ideas that are offensive? The VPO 
bars restrict a mark owner’s ability to engage in crude, coarse, and 
base manners of speaking.241 They do not restrict the ability to 
speak ideas that are offensive or critical.242 Any criticism asserted, 
or offense caused, by an idea within a mark is not the reason for 
denying a mark that contains immoral language.243 The mark’s 
language is offensive, independent of any offensiveness of the idea 
itself.244 The F-word, for instance, is highly offensive, regardless of 
whether the idea that it emphasizes is itself offensive. F—ING 
GOOD CHICKEN is offensive, whereas that mark’s idea—that the 
chicken tastes very good—is not.245 The purpose, then, of barring 
immoral language is to prevent offense at the mode of 
 
 238. See discussion supra Section IV.B.1. 
 239. See id. 
 240. See discussion supra Section IV.B.2. 
 241. See discussion supra Section III.A (explaining that the reason for offense is the 
crude portrayal of ideas). 
 242. See discussion supra Part II (illustrating that inappropriate ideas that do not use 
vulgar, profane, or obscene language would not be denied trademark protection). 
 243. See discussion supra Part III. 
 244. See generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992) (“The proposition 
that a particular instance of speech can be proscribable on the basis of one feature (e.g., 
obscenity) but not on the basis of another (e.g., opposition to the city government) is 
commonplace.”); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (“Nothing in 
the Constitution prohibits the [government] from insisting that certain modes of expression 
are inappropriate and subject to sanctions.”). 
 245. See discussion supra Section III.A (analyzing F—ING GOOD CHICKEN 
example). 
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communicating the idea.246 It is not to prevent criticism by, or 
offense taken from, the idea itself. 
This distinction between offense at an idea and offense at a 
mode is therefore key to the constitutionality of the VPO bars.247 
The distinction is apparent in Alito’s plurality opinion in Tam, 
where he declared that “[g]iving offense is a viewpoint.”248 As 
discussed above, the context of Alito’s opinion implies that giving 
offense based on an idea is a viewpoint.249 Alito was not speaking 
about giving offense through a mode of expression. Indeed, at the 
beginning of the Tam decision, where he briefly wrote for the 
unanimous Court, Alito explained the offense in terms of an 
expression’s idea: “Speech may not be banned on the ground that 
it expresses ideas that offend.”250 It appears clear, then, that Alito 
was not opining about offenses that derive from the mode of 
expression. 
This same distinction between an offense caused by a mode 
and an offense caused by an idea is further apparent in the 
Brunetti majority opinion. In arguing that the scandalous bar also 
requires a judgment about the acceptability of an idea (like the 
immoral bar), Justice Kagan explained: “[T]he category of 
scandalous marks thus includes both marks that offend by the 
ideas they convey and marks that offend by their mode of 
expression. And its coverage of the former means that it 
discriminates based on viewpoint.”251 Kagan’s reasoning is clear: 
the offense from an idea is different from the offense from a mode, 
and it is the idea offense—not the mode offense—that results in 
viewpoint discrimination.252 Implicitly, her reasoning indicates 
that offenses caused by modes are not viewpoint-discriminatory.253 
 
 246. Cf. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393 (“[T]he reason why fighting words are categorically 
excluded from the protection of the First Amendment is not that their content 
communicates any particular idea, but that their content embodies a particularly 
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to convey.”). 
 247. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2313–14 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing the distinction between ideas within a mark 
and the modes of expressing those ideas). 
 248. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017) (plurality opinion). 
 249. See discussion supra Section IV.B.1 (explaining that offense as a protected 
viewpoint is only with respect to ideas that are offensive). 
 250. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751 (emphasis added). 
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Question 2 
Do the VPO bars invite the PTO to apply its own judgment 
about whether an idea should be denied (which would be 
condemned by Brunetti and Tam)? The answer to this question is 
no. Because the bars do not target ideas, they do not call for any 
judgment about an idea. The VPO bars require a judgment about 
whether specific language is vulgar, profane, or obscene, but not a 
judgment about the ideas that the language communicates.254 
Importantly, the judgment about whether language is vulgar, 
profane, or obscene does not depend on individual moral values of 
PTO officers. The VPO bars are not hopelessly vague like the 
immoral bar. There is an established public understanding of 
words and images that comprise vulgar, profane, and obscene 
language.255 The FCC, for instance, already employs objective 
standards to define these categories.256 Particular words, specific 
bodily functions, specific body parts, and specific religious 
references are identified as comprising the content of vulgar, 
profane, and obscene language.257 Therefore, the PTO would 
neither apply its own judgment about any idea nor apply its own 
judgment about the meaning of the immoral language. Consistent 
with Tam and Brunetti, the VPO bars would not invite subjective 
application of moral judgments. 
One might argue that changing moral standards would make 
the VPO bars vague. What is vulgar today may become acceptable 
tomorrow. Yet a standard that depends on the public’s changing 
understanding of a word does not imply that a trademark standard 
is vague.258 Trademark law already recognizes standards for 
protection that depend on meanings that change.259 The bar to 
generic marks calls for an evaluation of whether the meaning of a 
 
 254. See discussion supra Section III.A (explaining basis for public offense of immoral 
language). 
 255. See discussion supra Part III (explaining meanings of vulgarity, profanity, and 
obscenity). 
 256. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 506–10 (2009) (explaining 
FCC’s interpretation and enforcement of indecency statute); Obscene, Indecent and Profane 
Broadcasts, supra note 61. 
 257. See discussion supra Part III. 
 258. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (providing trademark protection for marks that 
“become distinctive”). 
 259. See id.; cf. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 58 (2010) (“[T]he standard of extreme 
cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral judgment. The standard 
itself remains the same, but its applicability must change as the basic mores of society 
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word has become generic over time.260 The bar to descriptive 
marks may be overcome if a proponent can show that the mark 
has gained public recognition of the mark (i.e., secondary 
meaning).261 Application of these bars depends on the public’s 
understanding of meaning, which can change over time.262 
Changing public understanding of a word does not make a 
trademark bar vague. 
C. Judicial Support for VPO Bars 
This conclusion that the VPO bars are viewpoint-neutral 
draws support from statements by several Justices in the Brunetti 
case.263 Several Justices indicated that denying trademark 
registration for marks that are vulgar, profane, or obscene would 
be constitutional. Quoted below are their statements. 
Chief Justice Roberts stated: 
I also agree that . . . refusing registration to obscene, vulgar, 
or profane marks does not offend the First 
Amendment. . . . The Government . . . has an interest in not 
associating itself with trademarks whose content is obscene, 
vulgar, or profane. The First Amendment protects the 
freedom of speech; it does not require the Government to give 
aid and comfort to those using obscene, vulgar, and profane 
modes of expression.264 
Justice Alito stated: 
Our decision does not prevent Congress from adopting a 
more carefully focused statute that precludes the 
registration of marks containing vulgar terms that play no 
real part in the expression of ideas. The particular mark in 
 
 260. See, e.g., Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (holding 
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question in this case could be denied registration under such 
a statute. The term suggested by that mark is not needed to 
express any idea and, in fact, as commonly used today, 
generally signifies nothing except emotion and a severely 
limited vocabulary. The registration of such marks serves 
only to further coarsen our popular culture.265 
Justice Breyer stated: 
[I]t is hard to see how a statute prohibiting the registration 
of only highly vulgar or obscene words discriminates based 
on “viewpoint.” Of course, such words often evoke powerful 
emotions. Standing by themselves, however, these words do 
not typically convey any particular viewpoint.266 
Justice Sotomayor stated: 
Adopting a narrow construction for the word “scandalous”—
interpreting it to regulate only obscenity, vulgarity, and 
profanity—would save it from unconstitutionality. . . . 
 . . . . 
. . . To treat a restriction on vulgarity, profanity, or obscenity 
as viewpoint discrimination would upend decades of 
precedent. 
 . . . . 
 Prohibiting the registration of obscene, profane, or vulgar 
marks qualifies as reasonable, viewpoint-neutral, content-
based regulation. . . . The Government has a reasonable 
interest in refraining from lending its ancillary support to 
marks that are obscene, vulgar, or profane.267 
Writing for the Court majority, Justice Kagan suggested 
(without explicitly stating) that the VPO bars would be 
constitutional.268 Specifically, while drawing the distinction 
between offenses based on ideas that marks convey and offenses 
based on modes of expression, Justice Kagan contrasted the 
immoral and scandalous bars with bars that target marks that are 
“lewd” (which is akin to vulgar), “sexually explicit” (which is akin 
to obscene), and “profane.”269 She stated: 
The statute as written does not draw the line at lewd, 
sexually explicit, or profane marks. Nor does it refer only to 
marks whose “mode of expression,” independent of 
 
 265. Id. at 2303 (plurality opinion). 
 266. Id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 267. Id. at 2313–14, 2317 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 268. See id. at 2301–02. 
 269. Id. 
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viewpoint, is particularly offensive. It covers the universe of 
immoral or scandalous—or (to use some PTO synonyms) 
offensive or disreputable—material. Whether or not lewd or 
profane. Whether the scandal and immorality comes from 
mode or instead from viewpoint.270 
This contrast between the immoral and scandalous bars and 
“lewd, sexually explicit, [and] profane” bars suggests that Kagan 
views the latter group as constitutional. 
Thus, four Justices explicitly indicated that barring either 
vulgar, profane, or obscene modes of expression would be 
constitutional. Specifically, Justices Roberts and Sotomayor 
expressly condoned bars to “vulgar,” “profane,” and “obscene” 
modes of expression;271 Justice Breyer condoned bars to “vulgar” 
and “obscene” modes (and referred to “profane” in a supporting 
parenthetical);272 and Justice Alito condoned a bar to the “vulgar” 
mode.273 The remaining five Justices, through the majority opinion 
written by Justice Kagan, recognized a distinction between the 
bars that target immoral and scandalous content and the bars that 
target modes of expression that are lewd, sexually explicit, and 
profane.274 
D. Speech Theory 
Although free-speech doctrine may be interpreted as being 
consistent with the VPO bars, exceptions to core free-speech 
principles should be applied with caution. Doctrines are inherently 
flexible, always able to change for exceptional circumstances. The 
danger of flexible application is that exceptions may arise where 
the reason for the exception, in view of the reason for the doctrine, 
does not seem justifiable. To guard against this possibility, the law 
should respect the theory underlying the doctrine. Only if the 
exception is consistent with the theory should it apply. 
Accordingly, this Section analyzes whether the VPO bars are 
justified in view of the theory that underlies free-speech doctrine. 
The examination of theory proceeds in two parts. The first 
part considers whether a particular speech theory should govern 
the theoretical analysis of the VPO bars. It concludes that only the 
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 271. Id. at 2303–04 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 
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marketplace-of-ideas theory should govern the analysis.275 The 
second part performs that analysis. Arguing that vulgar, profane, 
and obscene marks are harmful to the marketplace of ideas, it 
concludes that the theory supports the VPO bars.276  
1. Speech Theories and Trademarks. Various theories 
underlie the right of free speech.277 Marketplace of ideas, 
individual liberty, and democratic self-governance are perhaps the 
most commonly cited.278 Marketplace theory posits that the 
purpose of speech protection is to provide a forum for testing the 
truth of ideas.279 As ideas compete for public acceptance without 
government interference, truthful ideas have the best opportunity 
to prevail—according to the theory.280 By contrast, individual-
liberty theory recognizes speech as an end in and of itself.281 The 
speech right exists for individuals to realize self-identity and 
fulfillment.282 Finally, democratic self-governance theory 
recognizes that the right of free speech is absolute with respect to 
speech related to self-governance in a democracy.283 Other types of 
speech may be regulated.284 
Of these theories, the marketplace of ideas seems most 
appropriate to evaluate content-based restrictions on trademark 
registration. When speaking a message through a trademark, a 
speaker is seeking for the mark to be accepted in the commercial 
marketplace.285 In other words, the trademark exists to gain public 
recognition, and more specifically, it exists to distinguish itself as 
 
 275. See discussion infra Section IV.D.1. 
 276. See discussion infra Section IV.D.2. 
 277. See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2:3 
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superior to other competing goods.286 As consumers form opinions 
about the good associated with the mark, the mark captures the 
reputation of the mark’s owner in comparison to other 
competitors.287 Hence, the purpose of a person’s speech through a 
trademark is to establish reputational distinction among 
competing goods in the eyes of consumers.288 
This purpose aligns well with marketplace theory. As already 
stated, the purpose of speech under marketplace theory is for ideas 
to compete against other ideas, with the public determining which 
ideas prevail.289 Just as ideas compete for public acceptance in the 
marketplace of ideas, marks compete for consumer recognition in 
the marketplace of commerce.290 Marks represent a specific subset 
of ideas, and consumers represent a specific subset of the public. 
Accordingly, the purpose of marks in the marketplace of commerce 
reflects a specific application of the purpose of ideas in the 
marketplace of ideas—competition with other ideas for public 
acceptance. 
Of course, speakers might employ trademarks for the purpose 
of exercising individual liberty or exercising democratic self-
governance. A seller, for instance, might use her own name as a 
mark for the purpose of gaining a sense of personal satisfaction: 
her name as a mark might provide self-fulfillment and self-
identity.291 Likewise, a person might use a political slogan as a 
mark to further the democratic process.292 In those instances, 
these other theories of speech law seem relevant to speech made 
through trademarks. 
These situations, however, do not imply that the restrictions 
on registration of a trademark should be evaluated according to 
these other theories. Recall that registration provides mark 
owners a right to exclude others from using the mark.293 That 
benefit of exclusion would not seem valuable to a mark owner who 
 
 286. See id. (“[Trademark] law helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating 
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product.”). 
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uses the mark to exercise individual liberty or democratic self-
governance. The mark owner who is exercising individual liberty 
through the mark is not concerned whether others replicate her 
mark, for she is only concerned about realizing her own self-
fulfillment through her speech. Similarly, the mark owner who is 
using the mark to exercise self-governance would not oppose 
another who replicated the mark, and in fact, would likely be in 
favor of that replication; the repetition would only serve to 
strengthen support for the democratic idea expressed through the 
mark. Hence, the restrictive nature of the VPO bars would seem to 
have minimal effect on speech expressed to realize individual-
liberty or self-governance interests. 
One might argue that the trademark rights are important to 
these other speech interests because they facilitate economic gain 
for speakers. That gain supports continued speech, which would 
again be made for realizing individual liberty and democratic self-
governance. For instance, the ADIDAS® mark is named after its 
founder, Adi Dassler.294 Suppose that Adi realizes self-fulfillment 
by using his name as the mark. Adi’s trademark rights over 
ADIDAS® enables him (or his company) to realize profits, from 
which Adi can make and sell more shoes with the ADIDAS® mark, 
ultimately yielding further self-fulfillment. In this way, trademark 
rights may be valued by those who use marks to realize individual 
liberty or democratic self-governance. 
Although the trademark rights may be valued by speakers 
with these individual liberty and self-governance interests, this 
fact does not imply that content restrictions on marks should be 
evaluated through these other theories. Even though mark owners 
may speak for purposes other than to gain market recognition, the 
value that those mark owners realize from being able to enforce 
their rights in a mark does depend on market recognition. In the 
example above, Adi cannot make more shoes with his name on 
them unless his brand has gained sufficient market recognition to 
perpetuate demand. Adi must rely on the market recognizing his 
marks. Reliance on the market implies that the speaker (Adi) must 
speak for the purpose of gaining market recognition, even if the 
ultimate purpose may be self-fulfillment. And if market 
recognition is one purpose, the speaker is necessarily seeking for 
her idea to prevail over another. Hence, to the extent that 
trademark rights matter to a speaker (such that they should not 
be restricted), they matter for the purpose of gaining consumer 
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recognition of the mark, which aligns only with marketplace 
theory. Marketplace theory is thus the appropriate lens through 
which to evaluate content-based restrictions on trademark 
eligibility. 
2. VPO Bars Under Marketplace Theory. How would 
trademark bars to vulgar, profane, and obscene language affect 
the marketplace of ideas? As a preliminary point, it is important 
to note that such bars would not impede any ideas from reaching 
that marketplace. The bars would target only modes of expressing 
ideas—not actual ideas contained within a mark.295 Although 
speakers would not be able to use the immoral language as a 
means for proclaiming ideas in the marketplace, the ideas 
themselves could still enter the marketplace and compete against 
others. So, without employing vulgar, profane, or obscene 
language, speakers could still freely communicate their ideas 
contained in trademarks. 
Nevertheless, restricting these offensive modes may affect the 
performance of an idea in the marketplace. The offensiveness of 
immoral language could serve to attract attention to the idea. F— 
THE DRAFT enters the marketplace of ideas with much greater 
force than I HATE THE DRAFT. Without immoral language, the 
emotive force of a mark may not be as strong, which could affect 
the attention that the mark receives in the marketplace of ideas.296 
This decreased attention, to a certain extent and in some 
circumstances, could affect the speaker’s ability to get his or her 
point across. Hence, there is a cost to restricting offensive modes. 
In the context of commercial trademarks, this cost appears 
worthwhile. Much of the public prefers not to experience 
commercial speech that is highly offensive—so much so that the 
offensiveness of the immoral language may interfere with the 
public even contemplating an idea.297 The message gets lost in the 
delivery. For instance, if a speaker chooses F—ING GOOD 
CHICKEN as his mark, some consumers are likely to refuse to test 
whether the speaker’s claim is true (about the tastiness of the 
chicken) simply because the F-word is used as a mode of 
 
 295. See discussion supra Section III.B.1 (explaining that the immoral language is a 
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expressing the idea. Others, though, will not care about the use of 
the F-word because it is not offensive to them, suggesting that the 
F-word does not accomplish its purpose of providing emotive force 
through offensive language. Others may be offended but still try 
the chicken; yet as they continue to encounter such language, they 
will likely become less offended, again decreasing the emotive 
force of the F-word.298 As immoral language becomes more 
common in trademarks, some consumers are likely to avoid 
trademarks wherever possible.299 Hence, use of the immoral 
language in marks will either decrease public participation in the 
commercial marketplace (thereby decreasing participation in the 
marketplace of ideas) or the use will weaken the offensiveness of 
the language in contravention to the very purpose for using that 
language. Put more simply, use of immoral language will either 
thwart participation in the marketplace or undermine the purpose 
of bringing attention to an idea. Therefore, barring vulgar, 
profane, and obscene marks supports a well-functioning 
marketplace of ideas. 
V.CONCLUSION 
Vulgar, profane, and obscene marks threaten a core purpose 
of commerce. That purpose is not merely to facilitate economic 
gain for certain members of the public. Commerce serves a more 
fundamental purpose—a purpose that “is integral to the fabric of 
a peaceful society.”300 The commercial marketplace facilitates 
peaceful interactions between citizens who have disparate 
backgrounds, beliefs, and behaviors. Its role is crucial in a 
democracy that consists of a diverse and pluralistic society. 
Opposing beliefs about religion, ideology, and politics all yield to 
commercial opportunities. Commerce, then, promotes civil 
dialogue and trust between people who often hold disparate beliefs 
and value systems. 
Vulgarity, profanity, and obscenity disrupt this purpose of 
commerce. They create an atmosphere that is offensive, that is 
emotionally provocative, and that thwarts universal 
participation.301 As the norm for commercial dialogue begins to 
reflect such base and course modes of communication, members of 
the public are less likely to feel welcome in the marketplace of 
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commerce.302 Crudeness replaces civility. Confrontational offense 
quickly overtakes peaceful cooperation.303 Vulgar, profane, and 
obscene communication subtly but effectively erode a fundamental 
purpose of commerce—establishing a civil society. 
Thus, the law should encourage civility in commercial 
transactions. To that end, trademark law plays a critical role.304 
Trademark represents the means for communicating commercial 
propositions. Civil dialogue in trademarks implies civility in 
commercial transactions. As trademark law discourages vulgar, 
profane, and obscene language, it promotes peaceful interactions 
between market participants. Trademark law represents an 
indirect means for the government to promote civility in the 
commercial marketplace. 
To be sure, the law must protect the freedom of mark owners 
to freely speak through their marks. The commercial marketplace 
is a forum for speaking about any idea—commercial or otherwise. 
But that right to speak has limits. The speech must not threaten 
the very forum in which persons seek to exercise their right of 
speech. Vulgar, profane, and obscene marks threaten that 
forum.305 Those sorts of marks must therefore be discouraged by 
denying them trademark protection. 
Doctrinally, such a denial is consistent with free-speech 
jurisprudence.306 The recent cases of Matal v. Tam and Iancu v. 
Brunetti are consistent with Congress enacting the VPO bars.307 
Tam’s teaching that giving offense is a viewpoint is only with 
respect to offense caused by ideas within the marks—not offense 
that results from certain modes of expression.308 Brunetti’s 
teaching that the government should not pass judgment on ideas 
within a mark does not apply to offensive modes of expression that 
a mark may employ.309 Accordingly, the VPO bars survive the 
holdings of Tam and Brunetti.310 
 
 302. See discussion supra Section III.B.2. 
 303. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2307 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“[Vulgar marks] may lead to the creation of public spaces that many 
will find repellant, perhaps on occasion creating the risk of verbal altercations or even 
physical confrontations. (Just think about how you might react if you saw someone wearing 
a t-shirt or using a product emblazoned with an odious racial epithet.)”). 
 304. See discussion supra Section III.C. 
 305. See discussion supra Section IV.D. 
 306. See discussion supra Section IV.C. 
 307. See discussion supra Section IV.B. 
 308. See discussion supra Section IV.B.1. 
 309. See discussion supra Section IV.B.2. 
 310. See discussion supra Section IV.B.3. 
58 HOUS. L. REV. 401 (2020) 
2020] IMMORAL TRADEMARKS 451 
Congress must act soon, though. Before the commercial 
marketplace begins to more fully adopt immoral language as 
trademarks, Congress must deny protection.311 As time passes, 
businesses begin to expect that such bars will never be in place. 
Expectations become settled, so that businesses begin investing in 
vulgar, profane, and obscene marks, all of which promise to 
emotionally grab the attention of potential consumers. As that 
investment occurs, Congress will find it politically difficult to bar 
the language. So, although today the bars will easily pass as a 
simple amendment to the Lanham Act, tomorrow is not as certain. 
Congress must immediately enact the VPO bars. 
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